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After years in which she and her children were physically abused by her
adulterous husband, a woman in Talladega County, Alabama, arranged to have
him killed. Tragically, murders of abusive spouses are not rare in our violent
society, but seldom are they punished by the death penalty. Yet this woman
was sentenced to death. Why?
It may have been in part because one of her court-appointed lawyers was
so drunk that the trial had to be delayed for a day after he was held in
contempt and sent to jail. The next morning, he and his client were both
produced from jail, the trial resumed, and the death penalty was imposed a few
days later.' It may also have been in part because this lawyer failed to find
hospital records documenting injuries received by the woman and her daughter,
which would have corroborated their testimony about abuse. And it may also
have been because her lawyers did not bring their expert witness on domestic
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1. Record at 846-49, State v. Haney, No. 7 Div. 148 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
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abuse to see the defendant until 8 p.m. on the night before he testified at
trial.
Poor people accused of capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who
lack the skills, resources, and commitment to handle such serious matters. This
fact is confirmed in case after case. It is not the facts of the crime, but the
quality of legal representation,3 that distinguishes this case, where the death
penalty was imposed, from many similar cases, where it was not.4
The woman in Talladega, like any other person facing the death penalty
who cannot afford counsel, is entitled to a court-appointed lawyer under the
Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Alabama.5 But achieving competent
representation in capital and other criminal cases requires much more than the
Court's recognition, in Powell and in Gideon v. Wainwright,6 of the vital
importance of counsel and of "thoroughgoing investigation and preparation."7
Providing better representation today than the defendants had in Scottsboro in
1931 requires money, a structure for providing indigent defense that is
independent of the judiciary and prosecution, and skilled and dedicated
lawyers. As Anthony Lewis observed after the Gideon decision extended the
right to counsel to all state felony prosecutions:
It will be an enormous task to bring to life the dream of Gideon v.
Wainwright-the dream of a vast, diverse country in which every
person charged with a crime will be capably defended, no matter what
his economic circumstances, and in which the lawyer representing him
will do so proudly, without resentment at an unfair burden, sure of the
support needed to make an adequate defense.
8
2. Nevertheless, both the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991), and the Alabama Supreme Court, Ex parte Haney, 603 So. 2d 412 (Ala. 1992), upheld
the conviction and death sentence in the case.
3. The defendant's other court-appointed lawyer was later disciplined by the Alabama Bar for neglect
in two worker's compensation cases, allowing the statute of limitations to run in both cases. Disciplinary
Report, ALA. LAw., Nov. 1993, at 401.
4. See, e.g., Mullis v. State, 545 So. 2d 205 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (person who hired others to rob,
kidnap, and kill victim, sentenced to life in prison); Busby v. State, 412 So. 2d 837 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982)
(woman charged with capital murder for hiring others to kill her husband, but convicted of noncapital
murder); see also Thacker v. State, 556 N.E.2d 1315 (Ind. 1990) (woman who asked three men to kill her
husband, gave them money and ammunition, and formed plan with them, not sentenced to death); Murder
Victim's Family Settles Case for Cash, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Aug. 7, 1990, at B I (charges dropped against
woman charged with capital murder for having hired somebody to kill her boyfriend when she agreed to
surrender $30,000 in retirement benefits to the victim's family).
5. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Powell involved seven young African-Americans sentenced
to death in Scottsboro, another Alabama community north of Talladega. The Supreme Court concluded that
the defendants "did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense" based upon the casual way in which the
responsibility for defending the case had been handled, the lack of preparation and investigation by the two
lawyers who defended the accused, and community hostility toward the defendants. Id. at 51-57.
6. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
7. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 57.
8. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 205 (1964).
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More than sixty years after Powell and thirty years after Gideon, this task
remains uncompleted, the dream unrealized. This Essay describes the
pervasiveness of deficient representation, examines the reasons for it, and
considers the likelihood of improvement.
I. THE DIFFERENCE A COMPETENT LAWYER MAKES iN A CAPITAL CASE
Arbitrary results, which are all too common in death penalty cases,
frequently stem from inadequacy of counsel. The process of sorting out who
is most deserving of society's ultimate punishment does not work when the
most fundamental component of the adversary system, competent
representation by counsel, is missing.9 Essential guarantees of the Bill of
Rights may be disregarded because counsel failed to assert them, and juries
may be deprived of critical facts needed to make reliable determinations of
guilt or punishment. The result is a process that lacks fairness and integrity.
For instance, the failure of defense counsel to present critical information
is one reason that Horace Dunkins was sentenced to death in Alabama. Before
his execution in 1989, when newspapers reported that Dunkins was mentally
retarded, at least one juror came forward and said she would not have voted
for the death sentence if she had known of his condition.'0 Nevertheless,
Dunkins was executed.
This same failure of defense counsel to present critical information also
helps account for the death sentences imposed on Jerome Holloway-who has
an IQ of 49 and the intellectual capacity of a 7-year old-in Bryan County,
Georgia," and William Alvin Smith-who has an IQ of 65-in Oglethorpe
County, Georgia. 2 It helps explain why Donald Thomas, a schizophrenic
youth, was sentenced to death in Atlanta, where the jury knew nothing about
his mental impairment because his lawyer failed to present any evidence about
his condition. 3 In each of these cases, the jury was unable to perform its
constitutional obligation to impose a sentence based on "a reasoned moral
response to the defendant's background, character and crime,"' 4 because it
was not informed by defense counsel of the defendant's background and character.
9. This Essay deals primarily with the problem at trial and on direct appeal where the state is required
to provide counsel for the indigent accused. It does not analyze the equally serious crisis regarding lack
of representation and inadequate representation in postconviction review. For such a review, see American
Bar Ass'n, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U.
L. REV. 1, 79-92 (1990). The Supreme Court has held there is no right to counsel, even in capital cases,
in postconviction review. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion).
10. Peter Applebome, 7wo Electric Jolts in Alabama Execution, N.Y. TIMEs, July 15, 1989, at A6.
11. Holloway v. State, 361 S.E.2d 794, 796 (Ga. 1987).
12. Smith v. Kemp, 664 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (setting aside death sentence on other grounds),
aff'd sub nom. Smith v. Zant, 887 F.2d 1407 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
13. Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 996 (1986).
14. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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It can be said confidently that the failure to present such evidence made
a difference in the Holloway, Smith, and Thomas cases. After each was
reversed-one of them for reasons having nothing to do with counsel's
incompetence-the pertinent information was presented to the court by new
counsel, the death sentence was not imposed. But for many sentenced to death,
such as Horace Dunkins, there is no second chance.
Quality legal representation also made a difference for Gary Nelson and
Frederico Martinez-Macias, but they did not receive it until years after they
were wrongly convicted and sentenced to death. Nelson was represented at his
capital trial in Georgia in 1980 by a sole practitioner who had never tried a
capital case.' 5 The court-appointed lawyer, who was struggling with financial
problems and a divorce, was paid at a rate of only $15 to $20 per hour. 6 His
request for co-counsel was denied.17 The case against Nelson was entirely
circumstantial, based on questionable scientific evidence, including the opinion
of a prosecution expert that a hair found on the victim's body could have come
from Nelson. 8 Nevertheless, the appointed lawyer was not provided funds for
an investigator 9 and, knowing a request would be denied, did not seek funds
for an expert.2" Counsel's closing argument was only 255 words long.2' The
lawyer was later disbarred for other reasons.
22
Nelson had the good fortune to be represented pro bono in postconviction
proceedings by lawyers willing to spend their own money to investigate
Nelson's case.23 They discovered that the hair found on the victim's body,
which the prosecution expert had linked to Nelson, lacked sufficient
characteristics for microscopic comparison. 4 Indeed, they found that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation had previously examined the hair and found
that it could not validly be compared.' As a result of such inquiry, Gary
Nelson was released after eleven years on death row.
Frederico Martinez-Macias was represented at his capital trial in El Paso,
Texas, by a court-appointed attorney paid only $11.84 per hour.26 Counsel
15. David Lundy, Bondurant's Costly Death Appeal, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Aug. 18, 1989,
at 6.
16. Id.; see also Affidavit of Howard A. McGlasson, Jr. at 6, 8, Nelson v. Zant (Super. Ct. Butts
County, Ga. 1989) (No. 5387), rev'd, 405 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. 1991).
17. McGlasson Affidavit, supra note 16, at 7.
18. Id. at 6, 15.
19. Id. at 7.
20. Id. at 8.
21. Lundy, supra note 15, at 6.
22. Id.
23. Id. Georgiadoes not provide counsel forcondemned inmates in postconviction proceedings. Nelson
was represented first by a lawyer recruited by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund who sent
the record to a lawyer at another firm, which took the case for postconviction proceedings. Id. Because of
his poverty, Nelson was completely at the mercy of these forces with regard to whether he would be
represented and the quality of that representation. Many are not as fortunate as Nelson.
24. Id.
25. Nelson v. Zant, 405 S.E.2d at 252.
26. Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1992).
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failed to present an available alibi witness, relied upon an incorrect assumption
about a key evidentiary point without doing the research that would have
corrected his erroneous view of the law, and failed to interview and present
witnesses who could have testified in rebuttal of the prosecutor's case.27
Martinez-Macias was sentenced to death.
Martinez-Macias received competent representation for the first time when
a Washington, D.C., firm took his case pro bono. After a full investigation and
development of facts regarding his innocence, Martinez-Macias won federal
habeas corpus relief.28 An El Paso grand jury refused to re-indict him and he
was released after nine years on death roW.
29
Inadequate representation often leaves the poor without the protections of
the Bill of Rights. An impoverished person was sentenced to death in Jefferson
County, Georgia, in violation of one of the most basic guarantees of our Bill
of Rights-the right to a representative jury selected without discrimination on
the basis of race.3" African-Americans make up 54.5% of the population of
that county, but the jury pool was only 21.6% black, a severe under-
representation of over 50%.3t But this issue was not properly raised and
preserved by the court-appointed lawyer for the accused. The defendant had
the extreme misfortune of being represented-over his protests-by a court-
appointed lawyer who, when later asked to name the criminal law decisions
from any court with which he was familiar, could name only two: "Miranda
and Dred Scott. 32 As a result of the lawyer's failure to challenge the racial
discrimination at or before trial, the reviewing courts held that the defendant
was barred from vindication of his constitutional rights.33
The difference that representative juries and competent counsel make in
capital cases is illustrated by the cases of two codefendants, John Eldon Smith
and Rebecca Machetti. They were sentenced to death by unconstitutionally
composed juries within a few weeks of each other in Bibb County, Georgia.34
Machetti's lawyers challenged the jury composition in state court; Smith's
27. Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 810 F. Supp. 782,786-87,796-813 (W.D. Tex. 1991), aff'd, 979 F.2d
1067 (5th Cir. 1992).
28. Id. at 823.
29. Gordon Dickinson, Man Freed in Machete Murder Case, EL PASO TIMEs, June 24, 1993, at 1.
30. U.S. CoNsT. amends. VI, XIV; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); see also Whitus
v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
31. Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 598 n.25 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984).
32. Transcript of Hearing of April 25-27, 1988, at 231, State v. Birt (Super. Ct. Jefferson County, Ga.
1988) (No. 2360). The lawyer referred to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Dred Scott was not a criminal case.
33. Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d at 601.
34. Georgia's "opt-out" provision allowing women to decline jury service was found to result in the
unconstitutional underrepresentation of women. Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236, 241 (11 th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1983) (applying Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), and Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)).
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lawyers did not because they were unaware of the Supreme Court decision
prohibiting gender discrimination in juries.
35
A new trial was ordered for Machetti by the federal court of appeals.36
At that trial, a jury which fairly represented the community imposed a sentence
of life imprisonment.37 The federal courts refused to consider the identical
issue in Smith's case because his lawyers had not preserved it.38 He was
executed, becoming the first person to be executed under the Georgia death
penalty statute upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1976.39 Had Machetti
been represented by Smith's lawyers in state court and Smith by Machetti's
lawyers, Machetti would have been executed and Smith would have obtained
federal habeas corpus relief.
In these examples, imposition of the death penalty was not so much the
result of the heinousness of the crime or the incorrigibility of the defen-
dant-the factors upon which imposition of capital punishment supposedly is
to turn-but rather of how bad the lawyers were. In consequence, a large part
of the death row population is made up of people who are distinguished by
neither their records nor the circumstances of their crimes, but by their abject
poverty, debilitating mental impairments, minimal intelligence, and the poor
legal representation they received.
A member of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles has said that if
the files of 100 cases punished by death and 100 punished by life were
shuffled, it would be impossible to sort them out by sentence based upon
information in the files about the crime and the offender.40 A justice of the
Mississippi Supreme Court made the same observation about the imposition
of death sentences in his state in testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee:
I dare say I could take every death sentence case that we have
had where we have affirmed, give you the facts and not tell you the
outcome, and then pull an equal number of murder cases that have
been in our system, give you the facts and not tell you the outcome,
and challenge you to pick which ones got the death sentence and
which ones did not, and you couldn't do it.
4'
35. Because Smith and Machetti were tried within a few weeks of each other in the same county, "the
Georgia provision applied to both juries." Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1469 (11 th Cir.), application for
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1344, 1345, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983). Smith's lawyers were unaware of
the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), decided six days before Smith's
trial started. Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d at 1470.
36. Machetti v. Linahan, 679 E2d at 242.
37. Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d at 1476 (Hatchett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38. Id. at 1469-72; see also id. at 1476 (Hatchett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
40. Tracy Thompson, Once 'Unfit To Live,' Ex-Death-Row Inmates Winning Parole, ATLANTA CONST.,
Mar. 12, 1987, at Al.
41. Habeas Corpus Reform: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
349 (1989-90) (statement of Justice James Robertson of the Supreme Court of Mississippi).
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Although it has long been fashionable to recite the disgusting facts of
murder cases to show how deserving of death particular defendants may be,
42
such renditions fail to answer whether the selection process is a principled one
based on neutral, objective factors that provide a "meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which the [death] penalty is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not."43 Virtually all murders involve tragic and
gruesome facts. However, the death penalty is imposed, on average, in only
250 cases of the approximately 20,000 homicides that occur each year in the
United States. 4 Whether death is imposed frequently turns on the quality of
counsel assigned to the accused.
11. THE PERVASIVE INADEQUACY OF COUNSEL FOR THE POOR AND THE
REASONS FOR IT
Inadequate legal representation does not occur in just a few capital cases.
It is pervasive in those jurisdictions which account for most of the death
sentences. The American Bar Association concluded after an exhaustive study
of the issues that "the inadequacy and inadequate compensation of counsel at
trial" was one of the "principal failings of the capital punishment systems in
the states today."45  Justice Thurgood Marshall observed that "capital
42. See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 62 U.S.L.W. 3546 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
denial of certiorari).
43. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1980) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188
(1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring))).
44. Fewer than 300 death sentences have been imposed each year in the United States over the last
20 years. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK 673,
Table 6.132 (1992). There have been approximately 20,000 homicides in each of those years. Id. at 357,
Table 3.122; see also id. at 539, Table 5.72 (death imposed in one percent of murder cases in 75 largest
counties).
45. American Bar Ass'n, supra note 9, at 16. The ABA's report illustrates the pervasiveness of the
problem:
Georgia's recent experience with capital punishment has been marred by examples of
inadequate representation ranging from virtually no representation at all by counsel, to
representation by inexperienced counsel, to failures to investigate basic threshold questions, to
lack of knowledge of governing law, to lack of advocacy on the issue of guilt, to failure to
present a case for life at the penalty phase....
• . . Defense representation is not necessarily better in other death penalty states. In
Tennessee, for another example, defense lawyers offered no evidence in mitigation in
approximately one-quarter of all death sentences affirmed by the Tennessee Supreme Court
since the Tennessee legislature promulgated its current death penalty statute.
Id. at 65-67. Among the cases cited by the ABA in support of its description of the inadequate
representation in Georgia are: Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 1986) (counsel failed
to present any evidence in mitigation), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 996 (1986); Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523
(11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 998 (1985) (counsel failed to present any evidence in mitigation);
Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1985) (counsel had been a member of the bar for only six months
prior to his appointment), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985); House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608 (11 th Cir.
1984) (counsel not even present during portions of capital trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Francis
v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (counsel conceded guilt at closing argument of guilt phase);
Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 817-20 (11 th Cir. 1982) (counsel unaware of law, distanced himself
from client, and otherwise failed to render effective assistance), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983); Young
v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792, 795 (11th Cir. 1982) (counsel failed to provide "even a modicum of professional
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defendants frequently suffer the consequences of having trial counsel who are
ill equipped to handle capital cases. 46 The National Law Journal, after an
extensive study of capital cases in six Southern states, found that capital trials
are "more like a random flip of the coin than a delicate balancing of the
scales" because the defense lawyer is too often "ill trained, unprepared...
[and] grossly underpaid."'47 Many observers from a variety of perspectives
and from different states have found the same scandalous quality of legal
representation.48
These assessments are supported by numerous cases in which the poor
were defended by lawyers who lacked even the most rudimentary knowledge,
resources, and capabilities needed for the defense of a capital case. Death
sentences have been imposed in cases in which defense lawyers had not even
read the state's death penalty statute or did not know that a capital trial is
bifurcated into separate determinations of guilt and punishment.49 State trial
assistance at any time" during capital trial); Mathis v. Zant, 704 F. Supp. 1062, 1064 (N.D. Ga. 1989) ("In
addition to betraying his duty to present what evidence he could on petitioner's behalf, [counsel] delivered
a closing argument that the Court in its prior order generously termed an 'apology for having served as
[petitioner's] counsel."'); Johnson v. Kemp, 615 F. Supp. 355, 364 (S.D. Ga. 1985) (counsel failed to
present evidence in mitigation), aff'd without opinion, 781 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1986); Cury v Zant, 371
S.E.2d 647 (Ga. 1988) (counsel failed to get independent psychiatric evaluation of defendant to determine
mental competency).
46. Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the Judicial Conference of the Second
Circuit, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1986). Justice Marshall noted that "[tihe federal reports are filled with
stories of counsel who presented no evidence in mitigation of their clients' sentences because they did not
know what to offer or how to offer it, or had not read the state's sentencing statute." Id.
47. Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt, NAT. L.J., June
11, 1990, at 30. Twelve articles examining the quality of representation in numerous cases in the six states
appear in id. at 30-44.
48. Witnesses before an ABA Task Force studying the capital punishment system described the current
state of affairs for indigent criminal defendants as "'scandalous,' 'shameful,' 'abysmal,' 'pathetic,'
'deplorable,' and 'at best, exceedingly uneven."' American Bar Ass'n, supra note 9, at 69; see also Ruth
E. Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama's Capital Defense Problems: It's a Dollars and Sense
Thing, 44 ALA. L. REV. 1, 32-37 (1992); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in
the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REv. 433, 491-99 (1993); Tom Wicker, Defending the Indigent in
Capital Cases, 2 CRIM. JUSTICE ETHICS 2 (1983); Jeanne Cummings, Bad Lawyers Tip the Scales of Justice
Toward Death Row, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 1, 1990, at Al; Anthony Lewis, Crime in Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1990, at A21; Andrea Neal, Death Row Inmates Point to Poor Quality of Lawyers Who
Defend Them, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1986, at 12; Frederic N. Tulsky, What Price Justice? Poor Defendants
Pay the Cost as Courts Save on Murder Trials, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 13, 1992, at AI [hereinafter Tulsky,
What Price Justice?]; Frederic N. Tulsky, Big-Tme Trials, Small Time Defenses, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept.
14, 1992, at Al [hereinafter Tulsky, Big-Time Trials]; Andrew Wolfson & Susan Craighead, Effectiveness
of Lawyers in Capital Cases Is Questioned, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 18, 1990, at 1, 23.
49. A lawyer in one Georgia case conceded his client's guilt and argued for a life sentence at the guilt
phase; he continued to plead for mercy even after he was admonished by the trial judge to save his
argument on punishment for the sentencing phase. Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792, 797 (11 th Cir. 1982).
A judge in a Florida case took a defense lawyer in chambers during the penalty phase to explain what it
was about. The lawyer responded: "I'm at a loss. I really don't know what to do in this type of
proceeding. If I'd been through one, I would, but I've never handled one except this time." Douglas v.
Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532, 1556 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded, 468 U.S. 1206 (1984), on
remand, 739 F.2d 531 (11th Cir. 1984), and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). An Alabama defense
lawyer asked for time between the guilt and penalty phases so that he could read the state's death penalty
statute. Record at 1875-76, State v. Smith, 581 So. 2d 497 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). The lawyer in a
Pennsylvania case tailored his presentation of evidence and argument around a death penalty statute that
had been declared unconstitutional three years earlier because it limited the arguments on which the defense
1842
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judges and prosecutors-who have taken oaths to uphold the law, including the
Sixth Amendment-have allowed capital trials to proceed and death sentences
to be imposed even when defense counsel fought among themselves or
presented conflicting defenses for the same client,50 referred to their clients
by a racial slur,5' cross-examined a witness whose direct testimony counsel
missed because he was parking his car,52 slept through part of the trial,53 or
was intoxicated during trial. 4 Appellate courts often review and decide
capital cases on the basis of appellate briefs that would be rejected in a first-
year legal writing course in law school.
55
There are several interrelated reasons for the poor quality of representation
in these important cases. Most fundamental is the wholly inadequate funding
could rely as to mitigating circumstances. Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 359 (3d Cir. 1992) (reversing
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel).
50. In one Alabama case, one defense lawyer sued co-counsel over attorneys fees before trial and the
attorneys were in conflict over personal differences during trial. Daniel v. Thigpen, 742 F Supp. 1535,
1558-59 (M.D. Ala. 1990); Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 48, at 34. In a Georgia case, one attorney
presented an incredible alibi defense while the other asserted a mental health defense that acknowledged
the accused's participation in the crime. Ross v. Kemp, 393 S.E.2d 244, 245 (Ga. 1990).
51. Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 n.13 (lth Cir. 1982) (defendant called a "little old
nigger boy" in closing argument by defense counsel); Ex parte Guzmon, 730 S.W.2d 724, 736 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1987) (Mexican client referred to as "wet back" in front of all-white jury by defense counsel); Record
Excerpts at 102, Dungee v. Kemp, No. 85-8202 (11 th Cir.) (defendant called "nigger" by defense counsel),
decided sub nom. Isaacs v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986).
52. House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 612 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984).
53. A judge in Harris County, Texas, responding to a capital defendant's complaints about his lawyer
sleeping during the trial at which death was imposed, stated: "The Constitution does not say that the lawyer
has to be awake." John Makeig, Asleep on the Job; Slaying Trial Boring, Lawyer Said, Hous. CHRON.,
Aug. 14, 1992, at A35. Defense counsel was found to have slept during a capital trial in Harrison v. Zant,
No. 88-V-1640, Order at 2 (Super. Ct. Butts County, Ga. Oct. 5, 1990), aff'd, 402 S.E.2d 518 (Ga. 1991).
54. People v. Garrison, 254 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1986). Counsel, an alcoholic, was arrested en route to
court one morning and found to have a blood alcohol level of 0.27. Yet the court was unwilling to create
a presumption against the competence of attorneys under the influence of alcohol.
55. See, e.g., Morgan v. Zant, 743 F2d 775, 780 (11th Cir. 1984) (Georgia Supreme Court affirmed
death sentence after receiving brief that contained only five pages of argument and was filed only in
response to threat of sanctions against the lawyer); Banda v. State, 768 S.W.2d 294, 297 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989) (dissent notes that court-appointed counsel raised a single point of error and the substantive portion
of the brief was 150 words); Modden v. State, 721 S.W.2d 859, 860 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ("The
points of error are multifarious, contain incomplete or no citations to the record, and fail to state an
adequate legal basis upon which complaint is made."); Brief and Argument in Support of Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Ex parte Heath, 455 So. 2d 905 (Ala. 1984) (No. 4 Div. 134) (one page of argument, raising
a single issue and citing one case) (set out in full in note 154 infra); Brief for Appellant, Thomas v. State,
266 S.E.2d 499 (Ga. 1980) (No. 36046) (six pages of poorly written argument, citing only nine cases,
which failed to raise issues regarding mental incompetence of the defendant, lack of any counsel at the
preliminary hearing, mental competency of the state's two key witnesses, vagueness of the aggravating
circumstance on which the death sentence rested, and other issues that were later raised in a brief of 70
pages which cited 96 cases in the postconviction appeal of the case to the Eleventh Circuit); see also In
re Dale, 247 S.E.2d 246, 248 (N.C. CL App. 1978) (due to financial considerations, attorney did not file
appeal in capital case); Docket Entry of July 8, 1983, of Clerk of Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals,
State v. Waldrop, 459 So. 2d 959 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (No. 7 Div. 133) (clerk wrote a letter to appellate
counsel, who had not cited any authority in his brief, asking him to include some citation to authority;
counsel sent a list of cases); Brief of Appellant, Morrison v. State, 373 S.E.2d 506 (Ga. 1988) (No. 45572)
(two pages of argument, citing two cases); Brief of Appellant, Newland v. State, 366 S.E.2d 689 (Ga. 1988)
(No. 45264) (62-page digest of the transcript, followed by only three pages of argument, citing not a single
case); Brief of Appellant, Cohen v. State, 361 S.E.2d 373 (Ga. 1987) (No. 44457) (four pages of argument,
citing two cases).
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for the defense of indigents. As a result, there is simply no functioning
adversary system in many states. Public defender programs have never been
created or properly funded in many jurisdictions. The compensation provided
to individual court-appointed lawyers is so minimal that few accomplished
lawyers can be enticed to defend capital cases. Those who do take a capital
case cannot afford to devote the time required to defend it properly. As a
result, the accused are usually represented by lawyers who lack the experience,
expertise, and resources of their adversaries on the prosecution side.
Many state court judges, instead of correcting this imbalance, foster it by
intentionally appointing inexperienced and incapable lawyers to defend capital
cases, and denying funding for essential expert and investigative needs of the
defense. The minimal standard of legal representation in the defense of poor
people, as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court, offers little protection
to the poor person stuck with a bad lawyer.
A. The Lack of a Functioning Adversary System
Many death penalty states have two state-funded offices that specialize in
handling serious criminal cases. Both employ attorneys who generally spend
years-some even their entire careers-handling criminal cases. Both pay
decent annual salaries and provide health care and retirement benefits. Both
send their employees to conferences and continuing legal education programs
each year to keep them up to date on the latest developments in the law. Both
have at their disposal a stable of investigative agencies, a wide range of
experts, and mental health professionals anxious to help develop and interpret
facts favorable to their side. Unfortunately, however, in many states both of
these offices are on the same side: the prosecution.
One is the District Attorney's office in each judicial district, whose
lawyers devote their time exclusively to handling criminal matters in the local
court systems. These lawyers acquire considerable expertise in the trial of
criminal cases, including capital cases. There are, for example, prosecutors in
the District Attorney's office in Columbus, Georgia, who have been trying
death penalty cases since the state's current death penalty statute was adopted
in 1973.
The other office is the state Attorney General's office, which usually has
a unit made up of lawyers who specialize in handling the appeals of criminal
cases and habeas corpus matters. Here, too, lawyers build expertise in handling
capital cases. For example, the head of the unit that handles capital litigation
for the Georgia Attorney General has been involved in that work since 1976,
the same year the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's death penalty statute. She
brings to every case a wealth of expertise developed in seventeen years of
litigating capital cases in all the state and federal courts involved in Georgia
cases. She and her staff are called upon by district attorneys around the state
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for consultation on pending cases and, on occasion, will assist in trial work.
It is the normal practice in Georgia that briefs by both the district attorney and
the attorney general are filed with the Georgia Supreme Court on the direct
appeal of a capital case.
The specialists in the offices of both the district attorneys and the attorneys
general have at their call local, state, and, when needed, federal investigative
and law enforcement agencies. They have a group of full-time experts at the
crime laboratory and in the medical examiner's offices to respond to crime
scenes and provide expert testimony when needed. If mental health issues are
raised, the prosecution has a group of mental health professionals at the state
mental facilities. No one seriously contends that these professional witnesses
are objective. They routinely testify for the prosecution as part of their work,
and prosecutors enjoy longstanding working relationships with them.
In Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and many other states
with a unique fondness for capital punishment, there is no similar degree of
specialization or resources on the other side of capital cases. A poor person
facing the death penalty may be assigned an attorney who has little or no
experience in the defense of capital or even serious criminal cases,56 one
reluctant or unwilling to defend him,57 one with little or no empathy or
understanding of the accused or his particular plight," one with little or no
56. See, e.g., Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1490-91 (9th Cir. 1992) (defendant represented at
capital trial by lawyer who had passed the bar six months earlier, had tried no criminal cases, and had not
taken any courses in criminal law, criminal procedure, or trial advocacy in law school); Tyler v. Kemp, 755
F.2d 741, 743 (11th Cir.) (defendant represented at Georgia trial by attorney with little criminal law
experience who had been admitted to the bar just a few months before trial), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026
(1985); Bell v. Watkins, 692 F2d 999, 1008 (5th Cir. 1982) (defendant represented at Mississippi capital
trial by attorney who had recently graduated from law school and never tried a criminal case all the way
to verdict); State v. Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425, 427 (La. 1993) (three of four attorneys appointed to defend
two defendants "were civil practitioners with little criminal law experience"); Parker v. State, 587 So. 2d
1072, 1100-03 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (defense lawyers asserted they were inexperienced in defense of
criminal cases and incompetent to handle a capital case in unsuccessful attempt to withdraw); State v.
Leatherwood, Miss. S. CL No. DP-70 (trial transcript) (defendant in capital case represented by third-year
law student and attorney), rev'd on other grounds, 548 So. 2d 389 (Miss. 1989).
57. See, e.g., Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F2d 1487, 1494, 1495, 1503, 1516, 1522 (11th Cir. 1985) (one
attorney appointed to defend capital cases claimed the appointment was "the worst thing that's ever
happened to me professionally"; another stayed on the case because "[t]o refuse would be contempt of
court"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986).
58. An African-American facing the death penalty in Walker County, Georgia, was represented by a
white defense attorney whose attitudes on race were described as follows by a federal district court before
concluding that the lawyer had not rendered ineffective assistance:
Dobbs' trial attorney was outspoken about his views. He said that many blacks are uned-
ucated and would not make good teachers, but do make good basketball players. He opined that
blacks are less educated and less intelligent than whites either because of their nature or because
"my grand-daddy had slaves." He said that integration has led to deteriorating neighborhoods
and schools, and referred to the black community in Chattanooga as "black boy jungle." He
strongly implied that blacks have inferior morals by relating a story about sex in a classroom.
He also said that when he was young, a maid was hired with the understanding that she would
steal some items. He said that blacks in Chattanooga are more troublesome than blacks in
Walker County [Georgia] ....
Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (denying habeas corpus relief), aff'd, 963 F.2d
1519 (11th Cir. 1991), remanded, 113 S. Ct. 835 (1993). Defendants in other cases have been referred to
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knowledge of criminal or capital punishment law, or one with no
understanding of the need to document and present mitigating
circumstances.5 9 Although it is widely acknowledged that at least two
lawyers, supported by investigative and expert assistance, are required to
defend a capital case, some of the jurisdictions with the largest number of
death sentences still assign only one lawyer to defend a capital case.60
In contrast to the prosecution's virtually unlimited access to experts and
investigative assistance, the lawyer defending the indigent accused in a capital
case may not have any investigative or expert assistance to prepare for trial
and present a defense. A study of twenty capital cases in Philadelphia in 1991
and 1992 found that the court "paid for investigators in eight of the twenty
cases, spending an average of $605 in each of the eight" and that the court
"paid for psychologists in two of them, costing $400 in one case, $500 in the
other.",61 It is impossible even to begin a thorough investigation or obtain a
comprehensive mental health evaluation for such paltry amounts.
Although the Supreme Court has held that indigent defendants may be
entitled to expert assistance in certain circumstances, 6 defense attorneys often
do not even request such assistance because they are indifferent or know that
no funds will be available. 3 Courts often refuse to authorize funds for
investigation and experts by requiring an extensive showing of need that
frequently cannot be made without the very expert assistance that is sought.'
by their lawyers with racial slurs. See supra note 51.
59. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
60. In Texas, which has the second largest death row in the nation and has carried out more executions
than any other state, the accused is given only one lawyer in many cases. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A
STUDY OF REPRESENTATION IN CAPITAL CASES IN TEXAS 156, 157 (1993) (prepared for the State Bar of
Texas). In Philadelphia, where the number of people sentenced to death is greater than the combined death
rows of 21 of the 36 states which have the death penalty, a capital case is often defended by a single
attorney. See Michael DeCourcy Hinds, Circumstances in Philadelphia Consign Killers, N.Y. TIMEs, June
8, 1992, at KI; Tulsky, What Price Justice?, supra note 48, at A18.
61. Tulsky, What Price Justice?, supra note 48, at A18.
62. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (indigent defendant has a right to mental health expert
where mental health issues are a "significant factor" at trial); see, e.g., Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d
1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The right to psychiatric assistance ... means the right to use the services of
a psychiatrist in whatever capacity defense counsel deems appropriate .... ).
63. A survey of lawyers and judges in Texas found that approximately one-half of the attorneys who
had handled a capital case and 33% of judges who had recently presided over a capital case indicated that
resources were inadequate to pay expert witnesses and attorneys. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note
60, at 159; see, e.g., Jeff Rosenzweig, The Crisis in Indigent Defense: An Arkansas Commentary, 44 ARK.
L. REV. 409, 410 (1991) (describing the dilemma of an Arkansas attorney in a capital case who needed a
psychiatrist to examine a defendant who had previously been diagnosed as schizophrenic; the lawyer was
first told by the judge to find a mental health expert closer to home and then denied funds after he located
a local psychologist).
64. In response to the denial of expert assistance for failure to make a sufficient showing in one case,
Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. pointed out for the dissenters: "[H]ow could [counsel] know if he needed a
microbiologist, an organic chemist, a urologist, a hematologist, or that which the state used, a serologist?
How further could he specify the type of testing he needed without first hiring an expert to make that
determination?" Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 743 (11th Cir. 1987) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642, 646 (11 th Cir.) (upholding denial of ballistics
expert because of insufficient showing by defense counsel of need for expert), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 872
(1988); Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (although the only issue at both guilt
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Many lawyers find it impossible to maneuver around this "Catch 22, ' '65 but
even when a court recognizes the right to an expert, it often authorizes so little
money that no competent expert will get involved.66
An indigent accused facing the death penalty in Columbus, Georgia, was
assigned counsel by the local trial judge, a former district attorney who had
tried high profile capital cases on the way to becoming a judge.67 Neither of
the two lawyers appointed had ever tried a capital case before. The lawyers
were denied any funds for an investigator or expert assistance. The case was
prosecuted by an assistant district attorney with over fifteen years of
experience in trying capital and other criminal cases. The defense was unable
to investigate the case or present any expert testimony in response to the
state's fingerprint and identification technicians, ballistics expert, coroner, and
medical examiner.
An Alabama attorney, appointed without co-counsel and granted only $500
for expert and investigative expenses to defend a highly publicized capital
case, facing three prosecutors and an array of law enforcement agencies and
expert witnesses, described his situation:
Without more than $500, there was only one choice, and that is
to go to the bank and to finance this litigation, myself, and I was just
financially unable to do that. It would have cost probably in excess of
thirty to forty thousand dollars, and I just could not justify taking
those funds from my practice, or my family at that time.68
Not surprisingly, the attorney was simply unable to investigate the case
properly:
I could not take days at a time out of my office to do essentially
non-legal work. And investigation is necessary, certainly, to prepare
a case, but it is non-legal .... You're actually pounding the
pavement, trying to come up with the same information that a person
and penalty phases was insanity and defense counsel made numerous motions for an independent
psychiatrist, denial of expert assistance was upheld because of the vague nature of defense counsel's request
and counsel's failure to provide any factual basis for his belief that defendant had psychiatric problems),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988).
65. In dissenting in Moore v. Kemp, Judge Johnson observed: "[The majority's reading of Ake creates
a proverbial 'Catch 22,' making it impossible for all but the most nimble (and prescient) defendant[s] to
obtain expert assistance." 809 F.2d at 742 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
66. For example, a review of capital cases in Philadelphia suggested experts were unwilling to consult
with defense lawyers because of the meager compensation. Tulsky, What Price Justice?, supra note 48,
at Al, AI8. One expert observed to a group of defense lawyers that she made more than they did. Id.
Another, a University of Pennsylvania professor who takes cases for defense lawyers outside Philadelphia,
explained his refusal to be retained by court-appointed counsel in capital cases in Philadelphia: "I like to
choose my charities .... This is a bad system, and unfair to the defendant." Id.
67. State v. Walker, No. 89 CR 56742-2 (Super. Ct. Muscogee County, Ga. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 424 S.E.2d 782 (Ga. 1993).
68. Deposition of Richard Bell at 24-25, Grayson v. State (Cir. Ct. Shelby County, Ala. Oct. 10, 1991)
(No. CV 86-193).
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who is paid substantially less per hour could take care of, I mean,
whether it be the investigator for the Sheriff's Department or the
District Attorney's office or the FB.I., or the U.S. Attorney's office.
You don't find the U.S. Attorney pounding the pavement, trying to
investigate facts .... And it just creates a terrible situation when you
have to do everything for yourself. 9
As a result, much of the investigation simply was not done and critical
evidence was not presented.7° With regard to the lack of funds for expert
witnesses, the lawyer testified that in civil cases, which constituted ninety
percent of his caseload, he would have hired the required experts because
failure to do so would have constituted malpractice.7'
An attorney involved in the defense of many capital cases in Arkansas has
described how lawyers in that state are forced to perform "a sort of
uninformed legal triage," ignoring some issues, lines of investigation, and
defenses because of the lack of adequate compensation and resources. 72 He
described the costs of such an approach: "The lawyer pays some in reputation,
perhaps, but it is his client who must pay with his liberty or life. 73
The adversary system often breaks down at the appellate level as well.
The poor defendant usually does not receive representation equal to that of the
prosecution in a state like Georgia, where on direct appeal of capital cases,
specialists in the offices of the Attorney General and District Attorney both file
briefs for the state. The poor person sentenced to death may be represented by
a lawyer with little or no appellate experience, no knowledge of capital
punishment law, and little or no incentive or inclination to provide vigorous
advocacy. For example, in one Georgia case, the court-appointed attorney filed
a brief containing only five pages of argument, and that only after the Georgia
Supreme Court threatened to impose sanctions.74 The lawyer did not raise as
an issue the trial court's charge to the sentencing jury, which was later found
by the U.S. Court of Appeals to have violated the Constitution, did not appear
for oral argument, and did not file a supplemental brief on the jury instruction
issue even after requested to do so by the court.75 Nevertheless, the Georgia
Supreme Court did not appoint other counsel or require adequate briefing.
Instead, with nothing more before it than counsel's deficient performance, the
court upheld the conviction and death sentence.76 The death sentence was
later set aside by the U.S. Court of Appeals.77 There have been numerous
69. Id. at 62-63.
70. Il at 56-59.
71. Id. at 29-31, 46-48.
72. Rosenzweig, supra note 63, at 412.
73. Id.
74. Morgan v. Zant, 743 E2d 775, 780 (11th Cir. 1984).
75. Id.
76. State v. Morgan, 246 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
77. Morgan v. Zant, 743 F2d 775 (11th Cir. 1984).
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other instances of grossly deficient representation on appeal in cases of those
condemned to die.78
B. The Lack of Indigent Defense Programs
In many jurisdictions where capital punishment is frequently imposed,
there are no comprehensive public defender systems whose resources can
parallel the prosecutorial functions of the district attorneys' offices. 79 There
are no appellate defender offices that parallel the function of the capital
litigation sections of the attorneys general's offices. In fact, there is no
coherent system at all, but a hodgepodge of approaches that vary from county
to county.
In many jurisdictions, judges simply appoint members of the bar in private
practice to defend indigents accused of crimes.80 The lawyers appointed may
not want the cases,8 ' may receive little or no compensation for the time and
expense of handling them, 2 may lack any interest in criminal law, and may
not have the skill to defend those accused of a crime. As a result, the poor are
often represented by inexperienced lawyers who view their responsibilities as
78. For other examples of deficient representation on appeal see supra note 55.
79. Only 11 of the 36 states which have the death penalty have statewide public defender programs.
THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 60, at 122, 125. Some of those state public defender programs have
specialized full-time capital litigation groups that provide representation in capital cases at trial. Id. Two
of those states, New Hampshire and Wyoming, have no one under death sentence. Id. at 119; NAACP
LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH Row USA I (winter 1993). Eight of the states with
statewide defense programs have death rows that are comparatively small: Connecticut (5); Delaware (16);
Maryland (14); New Jersey (9); New Mexico (1). Id. at 17,27,25,28,29. This leaves two states with large
death row populations, Ohio (127) and Missouri (83), with statewide programs and capital litigation
sections. Id. at 26, 29; THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 60, at 122. Florida and California, which
have two of the country's three largest death rows, have public defender programs, but many capital cases
in those states are handled by assigned counsel outside of the public defender system. Florida has an elected
public defender in each judicial circuit. Id. at 122-23. California has county public defender agencies in
all of its major counties. Id. at 123. Even though these programs cannot handle the huge volume of capital
cases in those states, they have annual training programs and provide materials which improve the quality
of representation in those states. No similar programs exist in Texas or many other states with large death
row populations.
80. Richard Klein. The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled To Render the
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. LJ. 363, 370 (1993).
81. For example, indigent defense boards in Louisiana maintain lists of "volunteer" and "non-
volunteer" lawyers and may appoint counsel from either list. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:145(A), (B)(l)(a)
(,Vest 1992); State v. Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425 (La. 1993) (involving four "non-volunteer" attorneys, three
of whom had little criminal law experience, appointed without compensation to defend two defendants
facing death penalty); State v. Clark, 624 So. 2d 422 (La. 1993) (finding attorney in contempt for refusing
to accept armed robbery case without compensation, his fifth felony appointment in four months). In some
judicial circuits, it is a requirement that attorneys newly admitted to practice take indigent appointments
during their first years in the bar. Jeanne Cummings, In Some Courts, It's "'No Contest"for Lawyers Given
Indigent Cases, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 6, 1990, at Al (noting requirement in Rome, Georgia, that all
attorneys with 15 years experience or less take criminal appointments)
82. "In all too many jurisdictions, the total compensation paid to court-appointed counsel does not
even meet their regular hourly overhead costs." RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, THE INDIGENT
DEFENSE CRISIS 5 (1993) (prepared for the American Bar Association Section of Criminal Justice Ad Hoc
Committee on the Indigent Defense Crisis). For example, in Virginia, the maximum fee allowable for most
felonies is $350. Id. at 6.
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unwanted burdens, have no inclination to help their clients, and have no incen-
tive to develop criminal trial skills. Lawyers can make more money doing
almost anything else. Even many lawyers who have an interest in criminal
defense work simply cannot afford to continue to represent indigents while also
repaying their student loans and meeting their familial obligations.
Some counties employ a "contract system" in which the county contracts
with an attorney in private practice to handle all of the indigent cases for a
specified amount. Often contracts are awarded to the lawyer-or group of
lawyers-who bids the lowest.83 The lawyer is still free to generate other
income through private practice. Any money spent on investigation and experts
comes out of the amount the lawyer receives. These programs are well known
for the exceptionally short shrift that the poor clients receive and the lack of
expenditures for investigative and expert assistance.S
4
A third system is the employment of a group of lawyers or an organization
to handle all indigent criminal cases while not engaging in any outside
practice. These lawyers are usually called "public defenders," although in some
jurisdictions they lack the investigative and support staff that is considered part
of a genuine public defender program. Some of these offices employ
remarkably dedicated attorneys, whose jobs are nonetheless made almost
impossible by overwhelming caseloads and low funding.
For example, the Fulton County Public Defender program, which serves
the courts in Atlanta, has achieved nationwide notoriety for its high
caseloads-an average of 530 felony cases per attorney for each year plus
extraditions, probation revocations, commitment, and special hearings-and
grossly inadequate funding.85 A public defender in Atlanta may be assigned
as many as forty-five new cases at one arraignment. At that time, upon first
meeting these clients-chained together-for a nonprivate, nonconfidential
"interview" in a holding area near the courtroom, she may plead many of them
guilty and have them sentenced on the spot. As one public defender described
disposing of seventeen indigent defendants: "I met 'em, pled 'em and closed
'em-all in the same day."86 This system of criminal procedure is known as
"slaughterhouse justice." When one lawyer in the office, after closing 476
83. Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 679 (1986).
84. Id. at 680. A contract arrangement in one Georgia county required that the attorney pay any inves-
tigative and expert expenses out of the $4265 he was to be paid that year for representing all of the
county's indigent defendants. Not surprisingly, often not one penny is spent on either investigative or expert
assistance in an entire year in some Georgia counties.
85. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, OVERVIEW OFTHE FULTON COUNTY, GEORGIA INDIGENT DEFENSE
SYSTEM (1990); Peter Appelbome, Study Faults Atlanta's System of Defending Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
1990, at B5; Monroe Freedman, Third World Justice, First World Shame, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
Feb. 8, 1991, at 6-7 (observing "daily, active collaboration" by judges in the "debasement of justice"); see
also Sandra McIntosh & Jeanne Cummings, Crisis in the Courts: Inmates Wait Months To See a Lawyer,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 6, 1991, at Al.
86. Trisha Renaud & Ann Woolner, Meet Em and Plead Em: Slaughterhouse Justice in Fulton's
Decaying Indigent Defense System, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Oct. 8, 1990, at 1.
1850 [Vol. 103: 1835
Counsel for the Poor
cases in ten months and still carrying a caseload of 122, asserted her ethical
obligation to limit her caseload, she was berated by the trial judge, who
refused her request; she was eventually demoted to juvenile court by the
director of her office. 87
A public defender in New Orleans represented 418 defendants during the
first seven months of 1991.88 During this time, he entered 130 guilty pleas at
arraignment and had at least one serious case set for trial on every single trial
date during the period. 9 In "routine cases," he received no investigative
support because the three investigators in the public defender office were
responsible for more than 7000 cases per year.90 No funds were available for
expert witnesses. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that, because of the
excessive caseloads and insufficient resources of the public defender office, the
clients served by this system are "not provided with the effective assistance of
counsel the [C]onstitution requires." 91
The structure of indigent defense not only varies among states, it varies
within many states from county to county. Some localities employ a combina-
tion of these programs. All of these approaches have several things in
common. They evince the gross underfunding that pervades indigent defense.
They are unable to attract and keep experienced and qualified attorneys
because of lack of compensation and overwhelming workloads. 2 Just when
lawyers reach the point when they have handled enough cases to begin
avoiding basic mistakes, they leave criminal practice and are replaced by other
young, inexperienced lawyers who are even less able to deal with the
overwhelming caseloads. Generally, no standards are employed for assignment
of cases to counsel or for the performance of counsel. And virtually no re-
sources are provided for investigative and expert assistance or defense counsel
training.
The situation has further deteriorated in the last few years. This is largely
due to the increased complexity of cases and the increase in the number of
cases resulting from expanded resources for police and prosecution and the
lack of a similar increase, and perhaps even a decline, in funding for defense
programs.93 The quality and funding for defense programs often varies greatly
87. Appelbome, supra note 85, at B5; Trisha Renaud & Ann Woolner, Borsuk Grilled in Fryer
Firestorm, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Oct. 12, 1990, at 1; Richard Shumate, "I Will Not Accept Any
More Cases," BARRISTER MAG., Winter 1991-92, at 11.
88. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993).
89. Id. A serious case was defined as "one involving an offense necessarily punishable by a jail term
which may not be suspended." Id. at 784 n.3.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 790.
92. "The caseload crisis can devastate the morale of often idealistic and dedicated attorneys." Klein,
supra note 80, at 393-94. In some offices, caseloads make it impossible for even the most competent and
well-intentioned lawyers to provide their clients with adequate representation. KLEIN & SPANGENBERG,
supra note 82, at 6, 7, 9.
93. Klein, supra note 80, at 393, 398, 403-04, 407. For example, Kentucky police and prosecutors
received $4.6 million from civil seizure and forfeitures in drug cases and $6 million from drug grants under
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from one county or judicial district to another in the same state. Texas, which
has one of the largest death row populations and has carried out the most
executions since the resumption of capital punishment in 1976,94 is one of
eight states in which indigent defense is handled at the county level with no
state funding. Funding for indigent defense varies significantly from county
to county.96 In Louisiana, the indigent defense system is funded by
assessments from traffic tickets. As a result, there have been "wide variations
in levels of funding," adding to a "general pattern.., of chronic underfunding
of indigent defense programs in most areas of the state." 97 Alabama finances
its indigent defense system through a tax on all civil and criminal filings in the
court system.98
The deficiencies in representation resulting from such haphazard and
underfunded approaches have been acknowledged. The vice president of the
Georgia Trial Lawyers Association once described the simple test used in that
state to determine whether a defendant receives adequate counsel as "the
mirror test." "You put a mirror under the court-appointed lawyer's nose, and
if the mirror clouds up, that's adequate counsel." 99 It is not surprising that
such a dysfunctional system is incapable of providing legal representation in
capital cases. Unlike the offices of the district attorneys and attorneys general,
there is no structure in many states for training and supervising young lawyers
in their initial years of practice to develop a cadre of attorneys who specialize
in the defense of complex cases. There are no job opportunities in indigent
defense for the young law graduates who want to become criminal lawyers.
And, because of the financial incentives, most of those who have or develop
good trial skills quickly move on to personal injury work or, if they remain in
criminal law, the more lucrative defense of drug, pornography, and white collar
cases.
the Federal Comprehensive Crime Control Act in fiscal year 1990, resulting in an increase of 114% in drug
arrests, but the state's public defender program received no money from either source. Edward C.
Monahan, Who Is Trying To Kill the Sixth Amendment? ABA CRIM. JUST., Summer 199 1, at 24, 27-28.
When this money is added to state funding, Kentucky's police and prosecutors received $156 million
compared to the public defenders receiving $11.4 million. Id. at 28. Thus, Kentucky police and
prosecutors receive $14 for every $1 provided for public defense.
94. Texas had 365 people under death sentence and had carried out 69 executions by October 1993.
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, supra note 79, at 9, 39. Since 1976, Texas has carried
out more than twice as many executions as any other state. Id.
95. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 60, at 151.
96. Id. The same variations are also found in other states. A report by a task force on indigent defense
appointed by the Governor of Kentucky found that funding per public defender case in one Kentucky
county was $44.22, while in another county the funding was $296.44. The Governor's Task Force on the
Delivery and Funding of Quality Public Defender Service Interim Recommendations, reprinted in
ADVOcATE, Dec. 1993, at 8 (published by Ky. Dep't of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, Ky.) [hereinafter
Kentucky Task Force Report].
97. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 789 (La. 1993). A study of the system found that there is a
"desperate need to double the budget for indigent defense in Louisiana in the next two years." Id. (quoting
THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STUDY OF THE INDIGENT DEFENDER SYSTEM IN LOUISIANA 50 (1992)).
98. ALA. CODE § 12-19-250 to 12-19-254 (1975).
99. Hal Strauss, Indigent Legal Defense Called "Terrible," ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 7, 1985, at 12A.
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C. Compensation of Attorneys: The Wages of Death
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, finding that
Federico Martinez-Macias "was denied his constitutional right to adequate
counsel in a capital case in which [his] actual innocence was a close question,"
observed that, "The state [Texas] paid defense counsel $11.84 per hour.
Unfortunately, the justice system got only what it paid for."' 0 What is
unusual about the case is not the amount paid to counsel, but the court's
acknowledgement of its impact on the quality of services rendered.
As we have seen, in many jurisdictions poor people facing the death
penalty are not assigned specialists who work for indigent defense programs,
but individual attorneys, often sole practitioners. In some jurisdictions, the
hourly rates in capital cases may be below the minimum wage or less than the
lawyer's overhead expenses.' 1 Many jurisdictions limit the maximum fee for
a case. At such rates it is usually impossible to obtain a good lawyer willing
to spend the necessary time.
Alabama limits compensation for out-of-court preparation to $20 per hour,
up to a limit of $1000.102 In one rare Alabama case where two lawyers
devoted 246.86 and 187.90 hours respectively to out-of-court preparation, they
were still paid $1000 each, or $4.05 and $5.32 per hour.'03
In some rural areas in Texas, lawyers receive no more than $800 to handle
a capital case. °'4 Generally, the hourly rate is $50 or less." 5 Attorneys
appointed to defend capital cases in Philadelphia are paid an average of $6399
per case.0 6 In the few cases where a second attorney has been appointed, it
is often at a fiat rate of $500.107 A study in Virginia found that, after taking
into account an attorney's overhead expenses, the effective hourly rate paid to
counsel representing an indigent accused in a capital case was $13.,) 8 In
Kentucky, the limit for a capital case is $2500.")9
Sometimes even these modest fees are denied to appointed counsel. A
capital case in Georgia was resolved with a guilty plea only after the defense
100. Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1992).
101. For the rates and maximums for each state, see Anthony Paduano & Clive A.S. Smith, The
Unconscionability of Sub-Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43 RUTGERS L. REV.
281, 349-53 (1991).
102. ALA. CODE § 15-12-21 (a) (Supp. 1992).
103. Smith v. State, 581 So. 2d 497,526 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). An opinion of the Alabama Attorney
General has since concluded that the sentencing phase of a capital case is to be considered a separate case,
allowing a maximum payment of $2000 for out-of-court time at a rate of $20 per hour. Op. Ala. Att'y
Gen. No. 91-00206 (Mar. 21, 1991).
104. Marianne Lavelle, Strong Law Thwarts Lone Star Counsel, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 34.
105. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 60, at 157.
106. Tulsky, What Price Justice?, supra note 48, at A18.
107. Tulsky, Big-Time Trials, supra note 48, at Al, AS. The $500 fee was to encourage lawyers to
get experience in capital cases. However, only a handful of lawyers took on cases because of the low
compensation. Id.
108. Klein, supra note 80, at 366.
109. Kentucky Task Force Report, supra note 96, at 11.
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attorneys, a sole practitioner and this author, agreed not to seek attorneys fees
as part of the bargain in which the state withdrew its request for the death
penalty.n0
In cases involving financial as opposed to moral bankruptcy, Atlanta law
firms charge around $125 per hour for their associates, $200 per hour for
partners, and $50 to $80 per hour for paralegals."' In civil rights and other
civil litigation, courts routinely order attorneys fees much higher than those
paid to appointed lawyers in capital cases." 2 Paralegals and law clerks in
civil fights cases may be compensated at rates equal to or better than what
experienced attorneys are paid in capital cases." 3 A new attorney at the
Southern Center for Human Rights, straight out of law school, was awarded
$65 per hour by a federal court in 1990 for work on a prison conditions
case." 4 More experienced lawyers on that case were paid at rates of $90,
$100, and $150 per hour. Attorneys appointed to death penalty cases in state
courts can never expect compensation at such rates.
A justice of the Georgia Supreme Court recently criticized that court's
limitation of attorneys fees in an employment discrimination case." 5 Limiting
the attorney to $50 per hour" 6 instead of providing the opportunity to
recover reasonable attorneys fees would, the justice argued, make it unduly
difficult to find lawyers for those who were victims of discrimination and
110. Mark Curriden, Fees for Pleas Called Improper, A.B.A. J., May 1993, at 28; Hard Bargain,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 19, 1990, at 12 (editorial); Marianne Lavelle, Cop Plea, But Forfeit Your Fee, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 19, 1990, at 29. Counsel had been forced to appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court to be appointed
because the local trial judge had refused to appoint the lawyers who won the defendant a new trial in
federal habeas corpus. See Amadeo v. State, 384 S.E.2d 181 (Ga. 1989).
11I. Tim O'Reiley, Billing Rates Crept Upward in 1992, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Feb. 15, 1993,
at IB; Tim O'Reiley, Lawyers Raised Prices Despite Slump, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Jan. 25, 1994,
at 1. The rates charged are supposed to be the attorneys' usual and customary prices.
112. See, e.g., Brooks v. Georgia State Bd. of Elections, 997 F.2d 857 (1 Ith Cir. 1993) (remanding
voting rights case for assessment of fees between $125 and $175 per hour); Davis v. Locke, 936 F.2d 1208
(11th Cir. 1991) (affirming attorneys fees of $150 per hour in civil rights action against prison guards);
Associated Builders & Contractors v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 919 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming
award of $165-$175 per hour for partners and $100 per hour for associates in suit alleging equal protection
violation in connection with school system set-aside construction program); Von Clark v. Butler, 916 F.2d
255 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming attorneys fees of $100 per hour for preparation time and $200 per hour for
in-court time in civil rights claim of excessive use of force in arrest); Cobb v. Miller, 818 F.2d 1227 (5th
Cir. 1987) (mandating $90 per hour in civil rights litigation for damages resulting during plaintiff's arrest
and conviction); Knight v. Alabama, 824 F Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (awarding attorneys fees ranging
from $275 per hour for lead counsel to $100-$200 per hour for other attorneys in school discrimination
action).
113. See, e.g., Martin v. Mabus, 734 F. Supp. 1216, 1230 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (awarding $35 per hour
for paralegal and student law clerk work in voting rights action).
114. Plyler v. Evatt, 902 E2d 273, 276 (4th Cir. 1990).
115. The court held that where a successful plaintiff was not contractually obligated to pay any fees
to her lawyer because the lawyer had been appointed by the Office of Fair Employment Practices, the
Georgia Fair Employment Practices Act did not allow an award of "reasonable attorneys fees." Finney v.
Department of Corrections, 434 S.E.2d 45 (Ga. 1993).
116. The attorney had contracted with the Commission on Equal Opportunity to provide representation
for $50 per hour, a fee which had already been paid. Katie Wood, Court Limits Fees in Bias Cases:
Decision Restricting Attorneys Fees Divides High Court, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., July 6, 1993, at
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"effectively den[y] many Georgians the key to the courthouse door."117 At
lower rates it is even more difficult to find attorneys for capital cases.
Thus, it is unlikely that lawyers will seek appointments in capital cases
when they can earn more handling other types of cases. It is undeniable that
"[i]n our pecuniary culture the caliber of personal services rendered usually has
a corresponding relationship to the compensation provided." 8 Lawyers who
have been appointed to defend the poor in capital trials often vow never to
handle another. It is financially disastrous, emotionally draining," 9 and, for
the small-town sole practitioner, it may be very damaging to relations with
paying clients. Even at $200 an hour, it would be difficult to attract lawyers
to handle these cases.
Not surprisingly, a recent study in Texas found that "more experienced
private criminal attorneys are refusing to accept court appointments in capital
cases because of the time involved, the substantial infringement on their
private practices, the lack of compensation for counsel fees and expert
expenses and the enormous pressure that they feel in handling these
cases."' 20 "In many counties, the most qualified attorneys often ask not to be
considered for court appointments in capital cases due to the fact that the rate
of compensation would not allow them to cover the expense of running a law
practice.'' t The same unwillingness to take cases because of the low fees
has been observed in other states. 22 Consequently, although capital cases
require special skills,"z the level of compensation is often not enough even
to attract those who regularly practice in the indigent defense system.
D. The Role of Judges: Appointment and Oversight of Mediocrity and
Incompetence
Even if, despite the lack of indigent defense programs and adequate
compensation, capable lawyers were willing to move to jurisdictions with
many capital cases, forego more lucrative business, and take appointments to
capital cases, there is still no assurance that those lawyers would be appointed
to the cases. It is no secret that elected state court judges do not appoint the
117. Finney v. Department of Corrections, 434 S.E.2d at 48 (Sears-Collins, J., dissenting).
118. Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1114-15 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043
(1987) (quoting MacKenzie v. Hillsborough County, 288 So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 1973) (Ervin, J.,
dissenting)).
119. See, e.g., Michael A. Kroll, Death Watch, CAL. LAw., Dec. 1987, at 24-27 (describing
unwillingness of some lawyers in California to take capital cases because of emotional toll and "burnout").
120. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 60, at 152.
121. Id. at 157.
122. See, e.g., Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 48, at 30; Paduano & Smith, supra note 101, at 333.
123. "Capital cases require perceptions, attitudes, preparation, training, and skills that ordinary criminal
defense attorneys may lack." Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 303-04 (1983); see also Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323 (describing in detail
the "evolving standard of care" for the defense of capital cases).
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best and brightest of the legal profession to defend capital cases.'24 In part,
this is because many judges do not want to impose on those members of the
profession they believe to have more important, financially lucrative things to
do. But even when choosing from among those who seek criminal
appointments, judges often appoint less capable lawyers to defend the most
important cases.
Judges have appointed to capital cases lawyers who have never tried a case
before."z A study of homicide cases in Philadelphia found that the quality
of lawyers appointed to capital cases in Philadelphia is so bad that "even
officials in charge of the system say they wouldn't want to be represented in
Traffic Court by some of the people appointed to defend poor people accused
of murder."' 26 The study found that many of the attorneys were appointed by
judges based on political connections, not legal ability. "Philadelphia's poor
defendants often find themselves being represented by ward leaders, ward
committeemen, failed politicians, the sons of judges and party leaders, and
contributors to the judge's election campaigns."'
127
An Alabama judge refused to relieve counsel even when they filed a
motion to be relieved of the appointment because they had inadequate
experience in defending criminal cases and considered themselves incompetent
to defend a capital case.'28 Georgia trial judges have repeatedly refused to
appoint or compensate the experienced attorneys who, doing pro bono
representation in postconviction stages of review, had successfully won new
trials for clients who had been sentenced to death. 129 In several of those
cases, the Georgia Supreme Court ordered continued representation at the new
trials by the lawyers who were familiar with the case and the client. Despite
those precedents, a Georgia judge refused to appoint an expert capital litigator
from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund to continue
representation of an indigent defendant, even though the Legal Defense Fund
lawyer had won a new trial for the client by showing in federal habeas corpus
proceedings that he had received ineffective assistance from the lawyer
appointed by the judge at the initial capital trial. 30 And the lower court
judges who have been reversed for failing to allow continuity in representation
are still appointing lawyers when new cases come through the system. Those
new defendants have no one to assist them in securing competent representation.
124. Trial and appellate judges are elected or face retention elections after appointment in most states
that have the death penalty. Some of the difficulties that elected judges have in protecting the rights of the
accused are described in Thomas M. Ross, Rights at the Ballot Box: The Effect of Judicial Elections on
Judges' Ability To Protect Criminal Defendants' Rights, 7 LAW. & INEQ. . 107 (1988).
125. See supra note 56.
126. Tulsky, Big-Thie Trials, supra note 48, at A8.
127. Id.
128. Parker v. State, 587 So. 2d 1071, 1100-03 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
129. Davis v. State, 404 S.E.2d 800 (Ga. 1991); Birt v. Montgomery, 387 S.E.2d 879 (Ga. 1990);
Amadeo v. State, 384 S.E.2d 181 (Ga. 1989).
130. Roberts v. State, No. $93A1857, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 200 (Ga. Feb. 21, 1994).
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A newly admitted member of the Georgia bar was surprised to be
appointed to handle the appeal of a capital case on her fifth day of practice in
Columbus, Georgia. Two days earlier she had met the judge who appointed her
when she accompanied her boss to a divorce proceeding. Only after she asked
for help was a second attorney brought onto the case. Another lawyer in that
same circuit was appointed to a capital case, but after submitting his first
billing statement to the judge for approval was told by the judge that he was
spending too much time on the case. He was summarily replaced by another
lawyer and the defendant was ultimately sentenced to death. For a number of
years, judges in that circuit appointed a lawyer to capital cases who did not
challenge the underrepresentation of black citizens in the jury pools for fear of
incurring hostility from the community and alienating potential jurors.' 3' As
a result, a number of African-Americans were tried by all-white juries in
capital cases even though one-third of the population of the circuit is African-
American.
The many other examples of exceptionally poor legal representation
documented by the American Bar Association (ABA), the National Law
Journal, and others indicate that judges either are intentionally appointing
lawyers who are not equal to the task or are completely inept at securing
competent counsel in capital cases. The reality is that popularly elected judges,
confronted by a local community that is outraged over the murder of a
prominent citizen or angered by the facts of a crime, have little incentive to
protect the constitutional rights of the one accused in such a killing. Many
state judges are former prosecutors who won their seats on the bench by
exploiting high-publicity death penalty cases. Some of those judges have not
yet given up the prosecutorial attitude.
United States Congressman William J. Hughes, a former New Jersey
prosecutor and leader on crime issues in the Congress, observed: "With some
of the horror stories we've heard-lawyers who didn't call witnesses, who
waived final argument-it is incredible that the courts allowed these cases to
move forward."'13 2 What is even more incredible is that in most of these
instances the judges appointed the lawyers to the case.
E. The Minimal Standard of Legal Representation Tolerated in Capital Cases
This sad state of affairs is tolerated in our nation's courts in part because
the United States Supreme Court has said that the Constitution requires no
more. Instead of actually requiring effective representation to fulfill the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of counsel, the Court has brought the standard down
131. See Gates v. Zant, 863 F2d 1492, 1497-1500 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 (1989).
132. Marcia Coyle et al., Washington Brief. High Noon for Congressional Habeas, NAT. L.J.. July 9,
1990, at 5.
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to the level of ineffective practice. Stating that "the purpose of the effective
assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of
legal representation," the Court in Strickland v. Washington'33 adopted a
standard that is "highly deferential" to the performance of counsel.'3 To
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
overcome "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance," show that the attorney's
representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,"' 135 and
establish "prejudice," which is defined as a reasonable probability that
counsel's errors affected the outcome.'36
As Judge Alvin Rubin of the Fifth Circuit concluded:
The Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, does not require
that the accused, even in a capital case, be represented by able or ef-
fective counsel .... Consequently, accused persons who are repre-
sented by "not-legally-ineffective" lawyers may be condemned to die
when the same accused, if represented by effective counsel, would
receive at least the clemency of a life sentence.
37
Much less than mediocre assistance passes muster under the Strickland
standard. Errors in judgment and other mistakes may readily be characterized
as "strategy" or "tactics" and thus are beyond review.138 Indeed, courts
employ a lesser standard for judging the competence of lawyers in a capital
case than the standard for malpractice for doctors, accountants, and
architects.
39
The defense lawyer in one Texas case failed to introduce any evidence
about his client at the penalty phase of the trial. The attorney's entire closing
argument regarding sentencing was: "You are an extremely intelligent jury.
You've got that man's life in your hands. You can take it or not. That's all I
have to say."140 A United States district court granted habeas corpus relief
133. 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 688-89.
136. Id. at 694.
137. Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring).
138. Klein, supra note 83, at 634. For an example of the extraordinary lengths to which some courts
will go to avoid finding a lawyer ineffective, see Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384 (11th Cir. 1994), where the
court, in reversing a finding by the district court of ineffective assistance in a capital case, stated: "Even
if many reasonable lawyers would not have done as defense counsel did at trial, no relief can be granted
on ineffectiveness grounds unless it is shown that no reasonable lawyer, in the circumstances, would have
done so." Id. at 386 (emphasis added). Rejecting other decisions by other panels of the same court holding
that strategic decisions must be based on investigation, the panel in Rogers concluded that "'strategy' can
include a decision not to investigate" and that "once we conclude that declining to investigate further was
a reasonable act, we do not look to see what a further investigation would have produced." Id. at 386-87,
388.
139. Klein, supra note 83, at 640-41.
140. Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1989).
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because of the lawyer's failure to present and argue evidence in mitigation, but
the Fifth Circuit, characterizing counsel's nonargument as a "dramatic ploy,"
found that the attorney's performance satisfied Strickland.'4' The lawyer was
later suspended for other reasons. 42 The defendant was executed.
Numerous other cases in which executions have been carried out demon-
strate that the minimal standard for attorney competence employed in death
penalty cases provides little protection for most poor persons accused of capital
crimes. The case of John Eldon Smith, the first person executed in Georgia
since the death penalty was restored, 143 is not exceptional. Smith's sentence
was upheld and he was killed despite a constitutional violation because of his
lawyer's ignorance of the law, while his codefendant won a new trial due to
the same constitutional violation and later received a life sentence. The second
person executed in Georgia after Smith was a mentally retarded offender,
convicted despite a jury instruction that unconstitutionally shifted the burden
of proof on intent; he was denied relief because his attorney did not preserve
the issue for review' 44 The more culpable codefendant was granted a new
trial on the very same issue.145 Again, as with Smith and Machetti, switching
the lawyers would have reversed the outcomes of the case.
John Young was sentenced to death in the same county as Smith. Young
was represented at his capital trial by an attorney who was dependent on
amphetamines and other drugs which affected his ability to concentrate. At the
same time, the lawyer was physically exhausted, suffering severe emotional
strain, and distracted from his law practice because of marital problems, child
custody arrangements, difficulties in a relationship with a lover, and the
pressures of a family business. 146 As a result, the lawyer made little
preparation for Young's trial, where his performance was inept. Young was
sentenced to death. A few weeks later, Young met his attorney at the prison
yard in the county jail. The lawyer had been sent there after pleading guilty to
state and federal drug charges.' 47 Georgia executed John Young on March
20, 1985.
James Messer was "represented" at trial by an attorney who, at the guilt
phase, gave no opening statement, presented no defense case, conducted
cursory cross-examination, made no objections, and then emphasized the horror
of the crime in some brief closing remarks that could not be fairly described
as a "closing argument."' 48 Even though severe mental impairment was
141. Id. at 877.
142. Suspensions, 56 Tsx. B.J., Jan. 1993, at 73.
143. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
144. Stanley v. Kemp, 737 F.2d 921 (1lth Cir. 1984), application for stay denied, 468 U.S. 1220
(1984).
145. Thomas v. Kemp, 800 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1986).
146. Affidavit of Charles Marchman, Jr. at 1-5, Young v. Kemp, No. 85-98-2-MAC (M.D. Ga. 1985).
147. Id. at 7.
148. Messer v. Kemp, 474 U.S. 1008, 1090 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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important to issues of mitigation at both the guilt and penalty phases, the
lawyer was unable to present any evidence of it because he failed to make an
adequate showing to the judge that he needed a mental health expert. 49 He
also failed to introduce Messer's steady employment record, military record,
church attendance, and cooperation with police. In closing, the lawyer
repeatedly hinted that death was the most appropriate punishment for his own
client. 5 ° This too was good enough for a capital case in Georgia. Messer
was executed July 28, 1988.
In light of Messer's case, one cannot help but wonder what progress has
been made since the Supreme Court held that there is a right to counsel in
capital cases in Powell v. Alabama. The nine black youths tried in Scottsboro,
Alabama, in 1931 for the rapes of two white girls were represented by a
lawyer described as "an able member of the local bar of long and successful
experience in the trial of criminal as well as civil cases" who conducted "rigor-
ous and rigid cross-examination" of the state's witnesses.15 1 That is more
than James Messer received at his capital trial.
Another case in which the attorney did nothing was that of Billy Mitchell,
executed by Georgia on September 1, 1987. Following a guilty plea, Mitchell
was sentenced to death at a sentencing hearing at which defense counsel called
no witnesses, presented no mitigating evidence, and made no inquiries into his
client's academic, medical, or psychological history.'52 A great deal of
information of this kind was available and, if presented, could well have
reduced the sentence imposed on Mitchell. In postconviction proceedings, new
counsel submitted 170 pages of affidavits summarizing the testimony of
individuals who could have appeared on Mitchell's behalf. Among them were
family members, a city council member, a former prosecutor, a professional
football player, a bank vice president, and several teachers, coaches, and
friends.
53
The same ineptitude is frequently tolerated on appeal. The brief on direct
appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court in the case of Larry Gene Heath,
executed by Alabama on March 20, 1992, consisted of only one page of
argument and cited only one case, which it distinguished. 54 Counsel, who
149. Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946, 951 (lth Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029
(1988).
150. Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1096 n.2 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1088, 1090 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
151. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 75 (1932) (Butler, J., dissenting) (quoting decision of Alabama
Supreme Court).
152. Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026, 1026-27 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari.).
153. Id.
154. What follows is the brief in its entirety. The only parts of the brief not set out below are the
cover page and certificate of service:
THE RECORD AFFIRMATIVELY SHOWS THAT THE APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED
OF THE SAME OFFENSE, WHICH IS PRECISELY THE SAME IN LAW AND FACT IN
VIOLATION OF THE 5th AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
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had filed a six-page brief on the same issue in the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals,155 did not appear for oral argument in the case. Although the United
States Court of Appeals later found counsel's performance deficient for failing
to raise issues regarding denial of a change of venue, denial of sixty-seven
challenges for cause of jurors who knew about the defendant's conviction in
a neighboring state arising out of the same facts, and use of the defendant's
assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights against him, it found no prejudice.
156
In the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals rendered on July 5, 1983, the Court failed
to address the issue as to whether or not the Appellant was tried and convicted of the same
offense, which is precisely the same in law and fact as the offense of which he was convicted
in the State of Georgia.
As the Court pointed out on Page 3 of it's [sic] opinion, there were no cited cases to any
Federal case law involving jeopardy in multiple State prosecutions and because there are no
Federal cases cited, the Court apparently ignored the law relative to multiple prosecutions for
an offense, which are precisely the same in law and fact.
Apparently the Court relied on the case of Hare v State, 387 So. 2 d [sic] 299, 300 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1980) in reaching it's [sic] decision in this case. The Hare case can be distinguished
simply by looking at the facts in the Hare case, wherein the Court in Tennessee was dealing
with the offense of possession of drgs in the State of Alabama, which are not precisely the
same in law and fact.
The Appellant plead guilty to the offense of murder, which was a lesser included offense
of the charge of murder caused and directed by the Appellant under the laws of the State of
Georgia and received a life sentence. After the Appellant was sentenced in the State of Georgia
to life imprisonment, he was returned to the State of Alabama and was prosecuted and convicted
of the offense of murder during kidnapping, 1st degree in the State of Alabama for the murder
of his wife, Rebecca Heath.
Apparently this case is one of first impression in the State of Alabama, and this Court has
not ruled on a similar case involving the offense of murder where only one victim is involved.
CONCLUSION
Appellant contends that his constitutional rights guaranteed under the 5th Amendment of
the United States Constitution and his rights guaranteed by Article I Section 9 of the Alabama
Constitution prohibiting Double Jeopardy and Double Punishment have been violated. Further,
Appellant contends that he relied upon his guaranteed Constitutional rights as set forth above
in pleading guilty to a lesser included offense of murder of his wife, in the state of Georgia, and
that the prosecution in the State of Alabama on the offense of murder during the course of kid
napping [sic] of his wife, should be barred.
Therefore, after considering the facts, law and argument of Appellant, a Writ of Certiorari
should be issued from this Court to the Court of Criminal Appeals correcting the errors
complained of and reversing the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and rendering such
judgments as said Court have [sic] rendered in addition to such other relief as Petitioner may
be entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
LARRY W. RONEY, AFORNEY AT LAW, P.C.
Appellant's Brief and Argument in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 1-2, Heath v.
Alabama, 455 So. 2d. 905 (Ala. 1984). Alabama requires that the brief and petition for certiorari be
submitted at the same time. ALA. R. CRuM. P. 32.2 (1990). Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court decided
Heath's case on the basis of this brief alone.
155. Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1131 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 981 (1992).
156. Id. at 1131-37. However, Judge J.L. Edmondson, in concurring, disagreed even with the court's
comment regarding counsel's performance. He stated, "I cannot agree that the quality of counsel's
performance can be judged much by the length of brief or the number of issues raised. . . . Effective
lawyering involves the ability to discern strong arguments from weak ones and the courage to eliminate
the unnecessary so that the necessary may be seen most clearly." Id. at 1141 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
The brief in Heath, however, and counsel's failure to appear for oral argument hardly constitute sterling
examples of such ability or courage.
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While such incompetence as has been described here passes muster as
"effective assistance of counsel" under the Supreme Court's view of the Sixth
Amendment, counsel's performance often fails to satisfy the increasingly strict
procedural doctrines developed by the Supreme Court since 1977. Failure of
counsel to recognize and preserve an issue, due to ignorance, neglect, or failure
to discover and rely upon proper grounds or facts, even in the heat of trial,
will bar federal review of that issue. 157 A lawyer whose total knowledge of
criminal law is Miranda and Dred Scott may be "not legally-ineffective"
counsel under Strickland,5 ' but such a lawyer will of course not recognize
or preserve many constitutional issues. The result has been what Justice
Thurgood Marshall described as an "increasingly pernicious visegrip" '' 9 for
the indigent accused: courts refuse to address constitutional violations because
they were not preserved by counsel, but counsel's failure to recognize and
raise those issues is not considered deficient legal assistance.
60
Together, the lax standard of Strickland and the strict procedural default
doctrines reward the provision of deficient representation. By assigning the
indigent accused inadequate counsel, the state increases the likelihood of
obtaining a conviction and death sentence at trial and reduces the scope of
review. So long as counsel's performance passes muster under Strickland,
those cases in which the accused received the poorest legal representation will
receive the least scrutiny on appeal and in postconviction review because of
failure of the lawyer to preserve issues.
In applying Strickland, courts indulge in presumptions and assumptions
that have no relation to the reality of legal representation for the poor,
particularly in capital cases. One scholar has aptly called the idea that bar
157. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527,533-36 (1986); Engle v. Isaacs, 456 U.S. 107, 130-34 (1982);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-91 (1977); see also Richard J. Bonnie, Preserving Justice in Capital
Cases While Streamlining the Process of Collateral Review, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 109-13 (1991);
Timothy J. Foley, The New Arbitrariness: Procedural Default of Federal Habeas Claims in Capital Cases,
23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 193 (1989).
158. The lawyer who testified that those were the only two "criminal" cases he knew has twice been
found to satisfy the Strickland standard. Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F2d 587, 596-601 (11th Cir. 1984) (en
bane), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984); Williams v. State, 368 S.E.2d 742, 747-50 (Ga. 1988). See supra
note 32.
159. Marshall, supra note 46, at 44 (footnotes omitted).
160. Justice Robert Benham of the Georgia Supreme Court was "struck by the powerful irony" of the
majority's refusal to consider an issue of "flagrantly improper" prosecutorial misconduct in one case
because it was not preserved by counsel, but holding that counsel was not ineffective. Todd v. State, 410
S.E.2d 725, 735 n.1 (Ga. 1991) (Benham, J., dissenting). The majority disposed of the ineffective assistance
claim in four sentences. Id. at 731. The Mississippi Supreme Court refused to consider two issues on direct
appeal because they were not properly preserved by trial counsel in Hill v. State, 432 So. 2d 427, 438-40
(Miss. 1983), over a dissent which argued, "We can think of no more arbitrary factor than having
nimbleness of counsel on points of procedure determine whether Alvin Hill lives or dies." Id. at 449
(Robertson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The same court later rejected in a single paragraph
an assertion that counsel was ineffective. In re Hill, 460 So. 2d 792, 801 (Miss. 1984). The dissent argued:
"Where two clear cut reversible errors were not available on direct appeal to a condemned defendant solely
because his lawyer goofed, that would seem to make a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of
counsel." Id. at 811 (Robertson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Other examples are collected
in Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 48, at 16-20.
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membership automatically qualifies one to defend a capital case "lethal
fiction."' 6' The reality is that most attorneys are not qualified to represent
criminal defendants and certainly not those accused of capital crimes. 62
There is no basis for the presumption of competence in capital cases where
the accused is represented by counsel who lacks the training, experience, skill,
knowledge, inclination, time, and resources to provide adequate representation
in a capital case. The presumption should be just the opposite-where one or
more of these deficiencies exist, it is reasonable to expect that the lawyer is
not capable of rendering effective representation. 63 Indeed, the presumption
of competence was adopted even though the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, who joined in the majority in Strickland, had written and lectured about
the lack of competence of trial attoreys. 64
Another premise underlying Strickland is that "[t]he government is not
responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney errors."' 65 However,
the notion of government innocence is simply not true in cases involving poor
people accused of crimes. The poor person does not choose an attorney; one
is assigned by a judge or some other government official. The government may
well be responsible for attorney errors when it appoints a lawyer who lacks the
experience and skill to handle the case, or when it denies the lawyer the time
and resources necessary to do the job. In addition, as observed by Justice
Blackmun:
The county's control over the size of and funding for the public
defender's office, as well as over the number of potential clients,
effectively dictates the size of an individual attorney's caseload and
influences substantially the amount of time the attorney is able to
devote to each case. The public defender's discretion in handling
individual cases-and therefore his ability to provide effective
assistance to clients-is circumscribed to an extent not experienced by
privately retained attorneys.
66
161. Green, supra note 48, at 433, 454.
162. Id. at 476-89.
163. The Louisiana Supreme Court, relying upon its state constitution and laws, has adopted such a
presumption where there is a likelihood of inadequate representation. Finding that the "provision of indigent
defense services" in one section of court in Orleans Parish "is in many respects so lacking that defendants
who must depend on it are not likely to be receiving the reasonably effective assistance of counsel," the
court adopted a rebuttable presumption that indigents in that section were not receiving constitutionally
required assistance. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 791 (La. 1993). The court ordered pretrial hearings
where there were questions of adequate representation and instructed the trial court "not [to] permit the
prosecution to go forward until the defendant is provided with reasonably effective assistance of counsel."
Id. at 792.
164. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Remarks on Trial Advocacy: A Proposition, 7 WASHBURN L.J. 15
(1967); Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of
Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973).
165. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 693 (1984).
166. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 332 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The assumption that deficient representation makes no difference,' 67
which underlies a finding of lack of prejudice under Strickland, is also
flawed. 168 In cases where constitutional violations were not preserved and the
defendant was executed while an identically situated defendant received relief
for the same constitutional violation, it is apparent that the ineptitude of the
lawyer did make a difference in the outcome of the case. In other more subtle
but equally determinative ways, competent legal assistance can make a
difference in the outcome which may not be detectable by reviewing courts.
69
A lawyer may muddle through a case with little or no preparation, but it
is impossible to determine how the case might have been handled differently
if he had investigated and prepared. Other difficulties may be even more
difficult to detect. Rapport with the client and the family may lead to
cooperation and the disclosure of compelling mitigating evidence that might
not be found by a less skillful attorney. 70 Good negotiating skills may bring
about a plea offer to resolve the case with a sentence less than death, and a
good relationship with the client may result in acceptance of an offer that
might otherwise be rejected. 171 Nor are reviewing courts able to determine
after the fact the difference made by other skills that are often missing in the
defense of criminal cases-such as conducting a good voir dire examination
of jurors, effective examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and
presenting well-reasoned and persuasive closing arguments.
The prejudice standard is particularly inappropriate for application to
deficient representation at the penalty phase of a capital case. It is impossible
for reviewing courts to assess the difference that investigation into mitigating
circumstances and the effective presentation of mitigating evidence might make
on a jury's sentencing decision.
The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed that in a capital case any
aspect of the life and background of the accused offered by the defense must
be considered as "mitigating circumstances" in determining punishment.1
7
167. "It is the belief-rarely articulated, but, I am afraid, widely held-that most criminal defendants
are guilty anyway. From this assumption it is a short path to the conclusion that the quality of
representation is of small account." David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1, 26 (1973).
168. "For a court to be required to engage in speculation about how the trial might have gone if
counsel had been effective is to minimize the importance of the sixth amendment right to counsel ......
Klein, supra, note 83, at 641; see also Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital
Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461, 477-80 (1987).
169. For other shortcomings of the Strickland standard, see Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System,
Advocacy and the Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE,
59, 83-85 (1986); Green, supra note 48, at 500-05; Paduano & Smith, supra note 101, at 326-31; Rodger
Citron, Note, (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction To Improve Indigent Defense
Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481, 486-88 (1991).
170. See White, supra note 123, at 340-46.
171. Id.
172. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that sentencer must consider "any aspect of
a defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death");
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (mental retardation must be considered in mitigation); Hitchcock
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Those who have tried capital cases have found that the competent presentation
of such evidence often results in sentences less than death.173 But the right
to have any of the "diverse frailties of humankind" 74 taken into account is
meaningless if the accused is not provided with counsel capable of finding and
effectively presenting mitigating circumstances.
A court-appointed defense lawyer's only reference to his client during the
penalty phase of a Georgia capital case was: "You have got a little ole nigger
man over there that doesn't weigh over 135 pounds. He is poor and he is
broke. He's got an appointed lawyer.... He is ignorant. I will venture to say
he has an IQ of not over 80. "175 The defendant was sentenced to death.
Had that lawyer done any investigation into the life and background of his
client, he would have found that his client was not simply "ignorant." Instead,
he was mentally retarded. For that reason, he had been rejected from military
service. And he had been unable to function in school or at any job except the
most repetitive and menial ones. His actual IQ was far from 80; it was 68. He
could not do such basic things as make change or drive an automobile. After
his death sentence was set aside because of failure to grant a change of
venue, 176 an investigation was conducted, these facts were documented, and
the defendant received a life sentence.
77
In another case, an attorney, obviously under the influence of alcohol,
came to the Southern Center for Human Rights, in Atlanta, after business
hours on a Friday evening. He was clutching part of a trial transcript and said
that he needed help preparing his brief to the Georgia Supreme Court for the
direct appeal of a mentally retarded man he had represented at trial who had
been sentenced to death. The brief was due the following Monday. Nothing
had been written for the appeal. It was impossible even to assemble the entire
record by Monday. Fortunately, an extension of time was obtained and eventu-
ally the case was remanded to the trial court. New counsel subsequently
negotiated a life sentence.
78
v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (jury instructions may not limit the jury's consideration of mitigating
circumstances); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (good behavior in prison must be considered
as mitigating factor); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (troubled childhood must be considered
as mitigating factor); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978) (same holding as Lockett).
173. White, supra note 123, at 325-29, 340-42.
174. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
175. Transcript of Opening and Closing Arguments at 39, State v. Dungee, Record Excerpts at 102,
(I I th Cir.) (No. 85-8202), decided sub nom. Isaacs v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1164 (1986).
176. Id. The court did not address the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, which had been
rejected by the district court.
177. Dungee v. State, No. 444 (Super. CL Seminole County, Ga.), on change of venue, No. 87CR-5345
(Super. Ct. Muscogee County, Ga. 1988).
178. See also Paduano & Smith, supra note 101, at 331-33 & nn.201-03 (other examples where life
sentences have been obtained for those previously sentenced to death at trials where they were represented
by incompetent counsel).
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In these and other cases previously discussed in Section I, once the facts
were discovered and brought out, life sentences were obtained for people
previously sentenced to death. But these were cases where by sheer luck the
defendants later received adequate representation on appeal or in
postconviction proceedings. Many of these cases were returned for retrials for
reasons having nothing to do with the poor legal representation at the original
trials. But, as shown by the many cases summarized here in which executions
were carried out, many of those facing the death penalty never receive the
representation that would make such a difference.
I. THE FAILURE To KEEP THE PROMISE OF GIDEON
The right to counsel is essential to protect all other rights of the criminally
accused. Yet this most fundamental right has received the least protection.
Nevertheless, many members of the judiciary and the bar-who have a special
responsibility to uphold the rule of law in the face of public outrage and
revulsion-stand by year after year, case after case, looking the other way,
pretending that nothing is amiss, or calling upon someone else to solve the
problem, but never engaging in a concerted and effective effort to change the
situation. The United States Department of Justice, the state District Attorneys,
and state Attorneys General, all of whom should have some concern about the
fairness and integrity of the judicial process, use their power and influence to
make the situation even worse. As a result, although some solutions to the
problem are apparent, the situation continues to deteriorate and, tragically, to
be increasingly accepted as the inevitable lot of the poor.
A. Minimal Reforms in Response to Major Crisis
Over ten years ago, the ABA and the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association found the funding for indigent defense inadequate and deemed the
promise of Gideon v. Wainwright unrealized, stating: "we must be willing to
put our money where our mouth is; we must be willing to make the
constitutional mandate a reality."' 179 However, despite many reports with
similar warnings, 18° another ABA report in 1993 still found that "long-term
neglect and underfunding of indigent defense has created a crisis of
extraordinary proportions in many states throughout the country.'.'
179. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N & THE NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, GIDEON UNDONE! THE
CRISIS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING 3 (1982).
180. Many of the reports are summarized in KLEIN & SPANGENBERG, supra note 82, at 10; Klein,
supra note 80, at 393.
181. KLEIN & SPANGENBERG, supra note 82, at 25.
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In Alabama, ten reports over eleven years pointed out the many defects in
representation of indigent defendants.' Judges, court administrators, and the
bar have recommended reform. A commission proposed in 1988 that the limits
on attorneys fees in capital cases be eliminated or raised, t8 3 but the
legislature has done nothing to change the limit on compensation for out-of-
court time expended by attorneys in capital cases.184 As a result, and despite
repeated acknowledgement of the problem, the quality of indigent defense in
Alabama remains a disgrace.
Limits on compensation have been struck down by courts in a number of
states. 5 However, even as courts have recognized the unreasonableness of
the low fees, the adverse impact of such low fees on the right to counsel and
a fair trial, and their own constitutional duty to do something about it,'86 they
have often ordered only minimal, inadequate reforms.
A challenge to Mississippi's limit of $1000 for compensation to lawyers
appointed to defend capital cases was rejected by the state's supreme
court. 87 The court held that lawyers were entitled to reimbursement for
actual costs, including the overhead cost of operating a law office, so that "the
attorney will not actually lose money,"'8 s but characterized the $1000 fee as
"an 'honorarium' or pure profit."'8 9 One justice published a dissent, which
had initially been prepared as the majority opinion, that carefully analyzed how
the statutory limit on compensation adversely affected the right to counsel and
182. Klein, supra note 80, at 402-03; Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 48, at 23 n.112.
183. Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 48, at 40 n.201. The Alabama Court of Appeals has also urged
the Alabama Supreme Court to reconsider its decisions upholding the constitutionality of the $1000 limit
on attorney compensation in criminal cases, observing that "[t]he real value of $1,000 is considerably less
today" than when set in 1981 and is "certainly unreasonable." May v. State, No. CR-92-350, 1993 Ala.
Crim. App. LEXIS 1076 (1993). However, one of the five members of the court disagreed, arguing that
the question of adequate compensation was a matter for legislation. Id. (Montiel, J., dissenting); see also
Ex parte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76 (Ala. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985) (upholding against due
process and equal protection attacks Alabama's system for compensating appointed attorneys); Sparks v.
Parker, 368 So. 2d 528 (Ala. 1979) (holding that the limit does not constitute unlawful taking of property),
appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 803 (1979).
184. "Many legislators seem to fear that support for funding for defense services in capital cases is
somehow the same as support for violent crime." Friedman & Stevenson, supra note 48, at 41-42.
185. DeLisio v. Alaska, 740 P.2d 437, 443 (Alaska 1987); Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770 (Ark.
1991); White v. Board of County Comm'rs, 537 So. 2d 1376, 1379 (Fla. 1989); Makemson v. Martin
County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1112, 1114 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987); State ex rel. Stephan
v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990); Jewell v. Maynard, 383
S.E.2d 536, 547 (W. Va. 1989).
186. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (Miss. 1990). There, in considering a challenge
to the $1000 limit on attorney compensation in capital cases, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated: "[I]f
the legislative branch fails its constitutional mandate to furnish the absolute essentials required for the
operation of an independent and effective court, then no court affected thereby should fail to act. It is the
absolute duty of a court in such latter circumstances to act and act promptly." Id. (quoting Hosford v. State,
525 So. 2d 789, 797-98 (Miss. 1988)). Nevertheless, the court refused to interfere with the legislature's
right to expend public funds and allowed Mississippi's limit of $1000 in compensation for the defense of
capital cases to stand. Id.
187. Id.; Pruett v. State, 574 So. 2d 1342 (Miss. 1990).
188. Wilson, 574 So. 2d at 1341.
189. Id.
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the administration of justice in violation of the Constitution.' ° However,
because that opinion was not supported by a majority of the court, an attorney
appointed to defend a capital case in Mississippi, while no longer required to
lose money, may still make less than the minimum wage. 9'
The Louisiana Supreme Court, considering a capital case in which assigned
counsel was neither compensated nor reimbursed for ,expenses, held that
counsel were entitled to reimbursement for out-of-pocket and overhead costs,
overruling contrary state precedent, 9 2 but held that a "fee for service need
not be paid" as long as the time required to defend the case does not reach
"unreasonable levels."'' 93
The South Carolina Supreme Court struck down that state's statutory
limitations on compensation of appointed counsel in capital cases. 94 The
statutes provided for $15 per hour of in-court time and $10 per hour of out-of-
court time for attorneys, with a limit of $5000 per case for attorneys fees,
expert and investigative services, and costs.' 95 Even in doing so, however,
the court discussed the fee limitations in the context of "the legal profession's
traditional and historic role in the general society. It is a role anchored to the
postulate that the practice of law is not a marketplace business or commercial
venture but, rather, a profession dedicated primarily to service."' 96 The court
accordingly held that "[t]he appointed attorney should not expect to be
compensated at market rate, rather at a reasonable, but lesser rate" to be fixed
in the court's discretion at the conclusion of the trial.' 97
One would hope that such an undesirable assignment as defending a
person in a capital case would be compensated at rates greater than market
rates, not less. In civil rights cases, the undesirability of a case is a factor used
to multiply or enhance an attorneys fee award. 98 For example, prison condi-
tions cases have been found to be "undesirable" for purposes of determining
whether to enhance attorneys fees. 99 However, legislatures and courts have
simply been unwilling to pay sufficient rates to attract lawyers to handle
capital cases.
190. Pruett, 574 So. 2d at 1342, 1343-69 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
191. All of the attorneys in the Wilson and Pruett cases received less than the minimum wage. The
two attorneys for Wilson documented 779.2 and 562 hours and the two attorneys for Pruett documented
449.5 and 482.5 hours. Each attorney was paid $1000 for his time. Thus, the rates ranged from $1.28 per
hour to $2.22 per hour. Id. at 1348 n.7 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
192. State v. Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425, 428-29 (La. 1993) (overruling in part State v. Clifton, 172 So.
2d 657 (La. 1965)).
193. Id. at 429.
194. Bailey v. State, 424 S.E.2d 503, 508 (S.C. 1992).
195. Id. at 505.
196. Id. at 504.
197. Id. at 508.
198. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1974).
199. E.g., Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 688 F. Supp. 1176, 1198-99 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (prison
conditions litigation per se undesirable), modified on other grounds, 688 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D. Tex. 1987),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 896 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1990), opinion
vacated in part on reh'g, 903 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
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There have been few systematic challenges to the inadequacy of legal
representation for the poor, and they have produced only limited results.200
Some hope of reforming Georgia's indigent defense system appeared when a
federal court of appeals held that a challenge to deficiencies in the system
stated a claim and should not have been dismissed.20t However, after a
change in the composition of the court, the case was dismissed on abstention
grounds.0 2 The federal courts also refused on abstention grounds to examine
Kentucky's limit on attorneys' compensation in capital cases.203
Despite abundant documentation of the enormity of the need for
substantive changes, some continue to suggest that the burden of providing
counsel to the poor-even in capital cases-may be satisfied by the
conscription of members of the legal profession.204 However, it is the
constitutional duty of the state,2°5 not of members of the legal profession, to
provide indigent defendants with counsel. Responses to the problems posed by
ineffective assistance of counsel should be conceived in a way that gives effect
to this principle. Georgia, a state in which there have been numerous egregious
examples of deficient representation, has no difficulty coming up with local,
state, and federal money to prepare for the Olympic Games, but it does not
secure or appropriate funding to assure competent representation and equal
justice in its courts.206
Though it is desirable for more members of the legal profession to
shoulder their ethical obligations to provide legal assistance for the poor, the
defense of capital cases often requires more expertise, commitment, and
resources than individual lawyers are able to offer. And there are too many
cases for the lawyers who do respond. Moreover, the absence of indigent
200. See, e.g., Tucker v. Montgomery Bd. of Comm'rs, 410 F. Supp. 494 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Wallace
v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135
(1974); State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984). These and other efforts to bring deficient indigent
defense systems into compliance with the Constitution are described in Klein, supra note 80, at 410-13,
417-18. See also Paul C. Drecksel, The Crisis in Indigent Criminal Defense, 44 ARK. L. REV. 363, 387-90
(1991); Caroline A. Pilch, Note, State v. Smith: Placing a Limit on Lawyers' Caseloads, 27 ARIz. L. REV.
759 (1985).
201. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 896 F.2d479 (1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 957 (1990).
202. Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g en banc denied, 983 F.2d 1084 (11th Cir.
1993).
203. Foster v. Kassulke, 898 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1990).
204. Martin County v. Makemson, 479 U.S. 1043, 1045 (1987) (white, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) ("I discern nothing in the Sixth Amendment that would prohibit a State from requiring its
lawyers to represent indigent criminal defendants without any compensation for their services at all.");
Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1338, 1341 (Miss. 1990); State v. Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425, 427-29 (La. 1993).
205. State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 835-37, 841-42 (Kan. 1987); Wilson, 574 So. 2d
at 1342 (Robertson, J., concurring).
206. Another example of the low priority that states give to their obligation to assure equal justice can
be found in Kentucky, where the indigent defense budget for 1990 of $11.4 million was four million less
than the University of Kentucky's athletic department for the same year. Edward C. Monahan, Who Is
Trying to Kill the Sixth Amendment? A.B.A. CRIM. JUsT., 24, 52 (Summer 1991). Kentucky's funding for
indigent defense for one year would build but four miles of two-lane highway. Id. at 51-52.
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defense programs limits the opportunity for young, committed lawyers to
enhance their skills and learn to do the job properly. Beyond these difficulties,
even the most conscientious lawyer needs proper investigative and expert
assistance to defend a capital case.
Moreover, to ask for such major sacrifices for such an overwhelming and
thankless job as defending a capital case from a few members of the profession
is unreasonable. Judges are not presiding without compensation, and district
attorneys are not prosecuting without decent salaries. And most members of
the legal profession-particularly those at the high income law firms which
have the litigation skills and resources equal to the task-are not being asked
to share the burden of defending the poor. The supply of lawyers who are
willing to make the sacrifice has never come close to satisfying the desperate
needs of the many poor who face the death penalty throughout the country
today.
Georgia Chief Justice Harold Clarke's description of Georgia's response
to the need for indigent defense applies to most other states as well: "[W]e set
our sights on the embarrassing target of mediocrity. I guess that means about
halfway. And that raises a question. Are we willing to put up with halfway
justice? To my way of thinking, one-half justice must mean one-half injustice,
and one-half injustice is no justice at all." 207
B. The Politics of Crime and the Lack of Leadership To Remedy the Situation
At this time, there appears to be little prospect of achieving even the level
of mediocrity that Chief Justice Clarke described. What is needed to provide
competent legal representation to any litigant, rich or poor, is no secret. But
significant improvement in the quality of representation for the poor is unlikely
because of the unpopularity of those accused and the lack of leadership and
commitment to fairness of those entrusted with responsibility for the justice
system.
A properly working adversary system will never be achieved unless
defender organizations are established and properly funded to employ lawyers
at wages and benefits equal to what is spent on the prosecution, to retain
expert and investigative assistance, to assign lawyers to capital cases, to recruit
and support local lawyers, and to supervise the performance of counsel de-
fending capital cases. Judges are not equipped to do this. Management of the
defense is not a proper judicial function. And, as previously described, all too
often political and other improper considerations influence elected state court
judges in their appointment of lawyers to defend those facing the death
penalty.
207. Chief Justice Harold G. Clarke, Annual State of the Judiciary Address, reprinted in FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., Jan. 14, 1993, at 5.
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What is needed is a system in which defense counsel's loyalty is to the
client and not the judge; and in which defense counsel, as well as the prosecu-
tor, understands the scientific and legal issues in the case and has access to the
investigative and expert assistance needed to prepare and present the case. The
ABA has promulgated standards for the appointment and performance of
counsel in capital cases,208 which are seldom followed today, but standards
mean nothing without capable attorneys and well-funded defender orga-
nizations to implement them.209
Moreover, it must be recognized that defending capital cases is a most
unattractive responsibility for most members of the legal profession. With the
increasing number of state and federal capital prosecutions, it will be more and
more difficult to find enough capable lawyers willing to defend the cases. It
should be recognized that, as in other difficult and undesirable areas of
practice, a significant financial incentive, considerably beyond what lawyers
receive for far less demanding legal work, will be required.
Such a system would require a substantial commitment of resources. The
argument has been made that some jurisdictions do not have the money to at-
tract qualified lawyers and that in some areas, particularly rural areas, qualified
counsel is simply not available.210 But these considerations should not excuse
the lack of adequate legal representation in capital cases. There are communi-
ties that have no pathologists, hair and fiber experts, evidence technicians, and
others needed for the investigation and prosecution of homicide cases.
However, when a murder occurs in those communities and is followed by a
capital prosecution, the prosecution invariably brings in the experts needed and
pays what it costs to do so.
There was a time when many localities did not have capable law
enforcement agencies or pathologists, fingerprint examiners, ballistics experts,
serologists, and other forensic scientists needed to investigate and prosecute
crime. These deficiencies were remedied in most places, often with funding
from the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration as well as state
and local governments. Crime laboratories were built, local police officers were
sent to FBI training programs, and pools of experts were developed who travel
around states to investigate crime scenes and testify in local prosecutions.
208. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL
IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (1990).
209. Standards for the appointment of counsel, which are defined in terms of number of years in
practice and number of trials, do very little to improve the quality of representation since many of the worst
lawyers are those who have long taken criminal appointments and would meet the qualifications. Such
standards can actually be counterproductive because they may provide a basis for denying appointment to
some of the most gifted and committed lawyers who lack the number of prior trials but would do a far
better job in providing representation than the usual court-appointed hacks with years of experience
providing deficient representation.
210. See, e.g., Report of Malcolm Lucas to ABA Task Force Report on the Death Penalty, 40 AM. U.
L. REV. 195, 197 (1990). The expense of providing more qualified counsel is repeatedly urged as a reason
to defeat legislation aimed at improving representation in capital cases.
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These jurisdictions could also establish defender organizations to provide
lawyers with the expertise required to defend capital cases, and the
investigators and expert assistance needed to prepare the defense of these
cases. What is lacking is not money, but the political will to provide adequate
counsel for the poor in capital and other criminal cases. Adequate
representation and fairness will never be achieved as long as it is accepted that
states can pay to prosecute a capital case without paying to defend one. Ade-
quate representation and fairness will never be achieved until ensuring justice
in the courts becomes a priority equal to public concern for roads, bridges,
schools, police protection, sports, and the arts.
But the leadership needed to help bring about justice is missing. There was
a time when the Attorney General of the United States and the attorneys
general in many of the states were concerned not just with getting convictions,
but also with fairness, integrity, and the proper functioning of the adversary
system.
In that spirit, Attorneys General Walter F Mondale of Minnesota and
Edward J. McCormack, Jr. of Massachusetts, and twenty-one of their fellow
attorneys general filed a brief in support of Clarence Earl Gideon's right to
counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright.21 It was out of that same concern that
Attorney General Robert F Kennedy helped secure passage of the federal
Criminal Justice Act in 1963. But those days are gone.
Today, the United States Department of Justice, state district attorneys, and
state attorneys general use their power and influence to make this shameful
situation even worse. They take every advantage of the ignorant, incompetent
lawyers foisted upon the poor.212 They have defended in the courts even the
211. 372 U.S. 335, 336 (1963).
212. At the urging of prosecutors, the federal courts and many state courts have increasingly refused
to consider constitutional issues even where the failure to raise them was the result of ignorance, neglect,
or inadvertent failure to raise and'preserve an issue by a court-appointed lawyer. Coleman v. Thompson,
111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) ("[A]ttomey ignorance or inadvertence is not 'cause"' to excuse filing of notice of
appeal three days late, as indigent prisoner "must bear the risk of attorney error") (quotation omitted);
Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 406-08 (1989) (barring relief because trial lawyer did not object to jury
instructions even though court of appeals had unanimously concluded that death penalty was
unconstitutionally imposed due to those instructions); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (barring issue not properly raised on appeal even though "[t]he record ... unquestionably
demonstrates that petitioner's constitutional claim is meritorious, and that there is a significant risk that he
will be put to death because his constitutional rights were violated"); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488
(1986) (holding that attorney "ignorance or inadvertence" does not constitute cause to excuse failure to raise
Fourteenth Amendment claim in earlier proceeding). Three of these cases-all except Murray v.
Carrier-were capital cases. In each of those cases, the defendant has been executed without a
determination of the constitutional issue because of the attorney error.
As a result of the complexity of the procedural rules and the lack of familiarity with them by many
of the lawyers appointed to defend the poor, executions are now routinely carried out without review by
any court of significant constitutional issues because of errors by counsel. See, e.g., Whitley v. Bair, 802
F2d 1487, 1496 n.17 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding that all 15 issues raised on behalf of Whitley were barred
because they had not been properly raised by his trial lawyer), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987). Today,
it is unusual to see a capital case in which one or more issues presented in federal habeas corpus review
is not found to be procedurally barred.
1872 [Vol. 103: 1835
Counsel for the Poor
most outrageous instances of incompetence on the part of defense counsel
previously described and used the ineptness of counsel as a barrier to prevent
courts from addressing constitutional violations in capital cases.
Despite abundant evidence of poor lawyering and egregious constitutional
violations in capital cases, the Justice Department and many prosecutors have
proposed shortcuts and procedural traps to paper over the problems and speed
up the process of sending those sentenced to death at unconstitutional trials to
their executions. In response to findings by federal courts of constitutional
violations in state capital cases, prosecutors have urged stricter enforcement of
procedural default rules to avoid dealing with the violations,213 not better
counsel to avoid those unconstitutional trials in the first place. Justice James
Robertson of the Mississippi Supreme Court described as "unseemly" the
arguments of that state's attorney general that the court "should hold [the
defendant's] claims procedurally barred, not because such would promote the
interests of justice, but rather that such would pull the rug out from under
[him] when he ultimately seeks federal review of his case."214 An
accommodating Supreme Court has been willing to cut back drastically on the
213. For example, the Mississippi Attorney General urged the state's supreme court to invoke
procedural bars as means of preventing federal review-characterized by the Attorney General as "a Crash
Upon the Rocky Shores of the Federal Judieiary"-following findings of constitutional violations in seven
of the first eight Mississippi capital cases reviewed by the federal courts. Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F2d 621,
626 n.5 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987) (quoting State's Response, Edwards v. Thigpen,
433 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1983), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987)). The Mississippi Supreme Court adopted
the state's position. Edwards v. Thigpen, 433 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1983).
Similarly, after federal habeas corpus relief was granted to a number of people in Georgia who had
been sentenced to death, Georgia amended its state postconviction statute in 1982 to prohibit consideration
in state habeas proceedings of issues not raised in compliance with Georgia's procedural rules at trial and
on appeal. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-14-51(d) (1993). The statute had previously provided that "rights conferred
or secured by the Constitution of the United States shall not be deemed to have been waived unless it is
shown that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege ...
participated in by the party and ... done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." 1967 Ga. Laws 835,
836, § 3; 1975 Ga. Laws 1143-44, § 1.
214. Evans v. State, 441 So. 2d 520, 531 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1264 (1984); see also Hill v. State, 432 So. 2d 427, 444-51 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., dissenting).
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availability of the once great writ of habeas corpus,2 5 and prosecutors have
supported even more drastic legislative proposals to restrict it further.2 1
Many prosecutors have been unwilling to agree to even the most minor
reforms to improve the quality of legal representation received by the poor.
Federal legislation was proposed in 1990 that would have restricted imposition
of the procedural default doctrines unless states improved the quality of de-
fense counsel. One proposal would have required the establishment of an
appointing authority for counsel in capital cases composed either of a statewide
defender organization or of a death penalty resource center.217 The appointing
215. Justice Stevens has expressed the view that the Supreme Court has "grossly misevaluate[di the
requirements of 'law and justice' that are the federal court's statutory mission under the federal habeas
corpus statute" and instead "lost its way in a procedural maze of its own creation." Smith v. Murray, 477
U.S. 527, 541 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, writing for four members of the Court
in Dugger v. Adams, accused the majority of "arbitrarily impos[ing] procedural obstacles to thwart the
vindication of what apparently is a meritorious Eighth Amendment claim." Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401,
412-13 (1989).
In addition to the strict enforcement of procedural rules, the Supreme Court has limited the availability
of the writ to vindicate constitutional rights by making it more difficult to obtain an evidentiary hearing
to prove a constitutional violation, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992); adopting an ex-
tremely restrictive doctrine regarding the retroactivity of constitutional law, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989); James S. Liebman, More than "Slightly Retro:" The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 537 (1991); reducing the harmless
error standard for constitutional violations recognized in federal habeas review, Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113
S. Ct. 1710 (1993); and restricting when a constitutional violation may be raised in a second habeas peti-
tion. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
216. The Justice Department and the associations of district attorneys and attorneys general have
supported a statute of limitations for habeas corpus cases since one was proposed by a committee appointed
by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and chaired by retired Justice Lewis Powell in 1989. Report of the Ad
Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239 (Sept. 27,
1989). Senator Joseph Biden introduced a bill in 1993 containing a statute of limitations and other
provisions regarding habeas corpus which had been drafted in sessions with representatives of the Justice
Department, state attorneys general, and state district attorneys, all of whom were said to support the bill.
139 CONG. REc. S10925-27 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993). The bill appears id. at S10927-31.
Some prosecutors have even proposed the virtual elimination of habeas corpus review by extending
to all issues the rule of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), which bars federal habeas review of Fourth
Amendment claims where there has been a "full and fair" hearing in the state courts. See, e.g., Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, on S. 88, S. 1757, and S. 1760, 101st Cong., Ist & 2d Sess.
759, 784 (1990) (Testimony of Ala. Assistant Attorney General Ed Carnes, Feb. 21, 1990, urging passage
of S. 1971 because that one provision "considered alone" makes it preferable to other legislation); Letter
from Alabama Attorney General Don Siegelman and 22 Other State Attomeys General to Senator Joseph
Biden (Mar. 12, 1990) (urging extension of "full and fair" rule to all claims to "accomplish true federal
habeas reform") (on file with author); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 172-82 (1991) (Statement of Andrew G.
McBride, Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice).
The "full and fair" provision was included in Section 205 of the Bush Administration's
Comprehensive Violent Crime Control Act of 1991, S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), sponsored by
Senator Strom Thurmond, which was included in the crime bill passed by the Senate on July 17, 1991.
S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). However, the Senate and House were unable to agree on a crime
bill in 1991 so the provision did not become law. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, who has led the judicial
and legislative efforts to restrict habeas corpus, opposed the "full and fair" proposal. Linda Greenhouse,
Rehnquist Urges Curb on Appeals of Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1990, at AI. And the Supreme
Court, which has cut back repeatedly on the availability of habeas corpus since 1977, refused, in Withrow
v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 3066 (1993), to extend the "full and fair" standard to issues involving violations
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
217. H.R. 4737, § 8(b) (1990), reprinted in Hearings Before Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual
Property and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Comm. on H.R. 4737, H.R. 1090, H.R.
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authority would have been responsible for securing qualified counsel and
engaging in periodic review to ensure the competence of representation. The
legislation would also have set standards for counsel and required payment for
counsel "at a reasonable rate in light of the attorney's qualifications and
experience and the local market for legal representation in cases reflecting the
complexity and responsibility of capital cases. '1 8
This modest proposal evoked vehement opposition from the U.S.
Department of Justice and state prosecutors. William P. Barr, then-Deputy
Attorney General and later Attorney General, characterized the counsel
provisions as "an elaborate and expensive system for appointing counsel" that
were "inimical to the principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional
system, and to the need for reasonable finality of state criminal judg-
ments., 21 9 A letter signed by the attorneys general of twenty-three states
which have the death penalty described the provisions as "so extreme as to be
absurd.,1 22 The twenty-three attorneys general asserted: "The current prob-
lems which beset capital cases are not caused by the quality of representation
they receive" and that "the focus in capital cases should be on the guilt or
innocence of the defendant and the sentence he should receive" and not "how
many seminars a defense attorney has attended, how well he is paid, and other
collateral matters."22 ' The National Association of District Attorneys adopted
a resolution opposing the legislation, reiterating its support for the procedural
default doctrines and "strongly oppos[ing] any legislation" which would "create
new requirements concerning the experience, competency, or performance of
counsel" beyond Strickland v. Washington.2 2
A bill introduced in 1993 would have required only a "certifying"
authority to identify lawyers to defend capital cases, allowing judges to contin-
ue to appoint counsel and setting only minimal standards measured in terms
of years of practice and number of cases with no inquiry into quality of
work.223 Although representatives of the state attorneys general and district
attorneys associations were involved in drafting the legislation,2 4 which
1953, and H.R. 3584, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 11 (1990) [hereinafter House Hearings].
218. H.R. 4737, § 8(e)-(g) (1990), House Hearings, supra note 217, at 14-16; see also H.R. 5269,
§ 1307(e)-(g) (1990), House Hearings, supra note 217, at 486-91.
219. Detailed Comments on H.R. 5269 Submitted with Letter from William P Barr to Thomas S.
Foley, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 10, 1990), reprinted in House Hearings, supra
note 217, at 723, 746-47.
220. Letter from Don Siegelman, Attorney General of Alabama et al., to Jack Brooks, Chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee (July 13, 1990), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 217, at 654, 656.
221. Id. The letter suggests that "delay" and "relitigation" are the major problems.
222. Resolution Opposing Habeas Reform Legislation, reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 217,
at 649.
223. The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1993, S. 1441, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1991) (introduced
by Senator Biden on August 6, 1993, 139 CONG. REc. S10925-31 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993)). The bill also
contained a statute of limitations and other restrictions on habeas corpus.
224. 139 CONG. REc. S10925-27 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993). No one involved in the defense of capital
cases or representation of petitioners in habeas corpus actions was included by Senator Biden or his staff
in the meetings which led to the bill.
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would, in fact, do little to improve the quality of representation and could even
worsen the situation,"2 5 it was opposed by many prosecutors.226 One letter
circulated among Senators criticized its "expansive and costly appointment of
counsel provisions" and quoted the Attorney General of Georgia as saying that,
if enacted, the bill would "effectively repeal the death penalty." 7
Such hyperbolic statements have repeatedly greeted other efforts to
improve the quality of legal representation in capital cases. When the Georgia
legislature, after years of refusing to appropriate any funds for indigent
defense,2 28 finally responded grudgingly to the eloquent appeals of the chief
justice of the state's supreme court 229 by creating in 1992 a small capital de-
fender program that employed only four attorneys, one district attorney
criticized it as a step toward abolishing the death penalty in Georgia.2"'
When a report to the Texas Bar described the serious deficiencies of the
representation in capital cases in that state, the district attorney in Houston dis-
missed it as an argument against the death penalty. 
32
225. The bill did not remove the judge as the appointing authority. Most of the incompetent lawyers
providing representation would still qualify under the bill's requirements of a certain number of years of
practice or trials, but many conscientious and capable young lawyers would be excluded.
226. California Attorney General Daniel E. Lungren asserted that the bill "could appropriately be
called the 'Capital Defense Attorney Employment Act of 1993' and urged its defeat because it would
"raise the overall cost of capital litigation by imposing new federal standards" and result in additional litiga-
tion. Letter from Daniel E. Lungren to Senator Diane Feinstein (Aug. 13, 1993) at 15 (on file with author).
The California District Attorneys Association adopted a resolution opposing any legislation which would:
[C]reate new requirements concerning the experience, competency, or performance of counsel
beyond those required by the United States Constitution as interpreted in Strickland v.
Washington....
[D]ictate new federal standards concerning the appointment of counsel for state court pro-
ceedings or take away the traditional authority to appoint counsel from state court judges....
[E]stablish stringent federal qualifications for the appointment of counsel (including the
appointment of at least two attorneys beginning at the state trial stage) which would delay death
penalty cases by the inability to locate a sufficient number of attorneys who can meet all of the
mandatory standards....
California District Attorneys Association, Resolution Concerning Federal Habeas Corpus Reform
Legislation (adopted Aug. 12, 1993) (on file with author).
227. Letter from Senators Orin G. Hatch, Strom Thurmond, Diane Feinstein, and Richard Shelby to
Colleagues (Nov. 2, 1993) (on file with author).
228. Georgia State Senator Gary Parker explained to an American Bar Association committee:
Although many of my colleagues in the legislature realize what is needed-a centralized, truly
independent capital defender office staffed by experienced capital trial counsel-they are
unquestionably unwilling, as they have demonstrated year after year, to appropriate the funds.
... Quite to the contrary, support for indigent defense is viewed by many in this state as being
soft on crime.
Testimony of Gary Parker to the ABA Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, quoted in American
Bar Ass'n, supra note 9, at 221 n.38.
229. Harold G. Clarke, Money v. Justice in Georgia ("State of the Judiciary Address" to the Georgia
General Assembly), reprinted in FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Jan. 22, 1992, at 8; Harold G. Clarke, State
of the Judiciary (Address to the State Bar of Georgia), reprinted in GA. ST. B.J., Aug. 1991, at 70.
230. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-91 (1992). There are over 120 capital indictments pending in Georgia
at any given time, so the program can handle only a small portion of the cases.
231. Kimball Perry, Poor People To Get Added Help in Courts, COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER, Oct.
6, 1992, at B1.
232. Gary Taylor, Texas Death-Penalty Study Hit, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 26, 1993, at 3, 50. Taylor quoted
Harris County District Attorney John B. Holmes, Jr., as saying: "If you're against the death penalty, argue
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The enthusiasm of prosecutors to continue to take every advantage has not
been tempered by the poverty and powerlessness of those accused of capital
crimes. Nor has the situation motivated a new presidential administration or a
new Attorney General to rein in the assaults on the Bill of Rights and habeas
corpus or question the power that state courts should be allowed to exercise
over the lives of persons who are not provided adequate representation.23 In-
stead, the country is engaged in a crime debate in which politicians try to
outdo one another in proposing crime bills which simultaneously expand the
use of the death penalty and other severe penalties while restricting or
eliminating procedural protections. Those who are supposedly leaders dismiss
the Bill of Rights as a mere collection of technicalities. The debate is
exceptionally one-sided. For, as Robert F. Kennedy said long ago, the poor
person accused of a crime has no lobby. No member of Congress or a state
legislature is likely to receive complaints about the quality of counsel for poor
people accused of crimes. But lost in the effort to get tough on crime is
concern about the fairness and integrity of the criminal justice system.
Completely missing from the crime debate and from the courts is the
notion that if it is too expensive or impractical for some jurisdictions to
provide competent counsel and the fairness and reliability that should
accompany a judicial decision to take a human life, their power should be
limited. If a local trial court cannot comply with the most fundamental safe-
guard of the Constitution by providing a capable attorney to one whose life is
at stake, it should not be authorized to extinguish life. The solution is not to
depreciate human life and the Bill of Rights by accepting what is available.
Many small communities do not have surgeons, yet they do not rely on chiro-
practors to perform heart surgery.
Pronouncements about the importance of and the need for counsel do not
make quality representation a reality. It has become apparent that the
legislatures of most states, particularly those where the death penalty is
frequently imposed, are not going to discharge their constitutional duty to
appropriate funds and provide competent legal assistance for poor persons in
criminal cases. It is also unlikely that the judiciary and bar, after years of
neglect, punctuated by occasional moments of hand wringing, will respond
effectively to this worsening situation.
against the issue. But don't come in the back door with so much financial baggage that the law can't work.
That just promotes more disrespect for the law." Id. at 50. Holmes also said that there was "too much
habeas." Id.
233. President Clinton used the death penalty to establish his credentials as a "new Democrat" who
was tough on crime by returning to Arkansas during the presidential campaign to deny clemency and allow
the execution of a severely brain damaged man. See Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, Nsw YORKER,
Feb. 22, 1993, at 105. President Clinton has supported legislation to make over 50 federal crimes
punishable by death.
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IV. THE NEED FOR INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES AND LIMITS ON THE POWER OF
THE COURTS
The quality of legal representation in capital cases in many states is a
scandal. However, almost no one cares. Those facing the death penalty are
generally poor, often members of racial minorities, often afflicted with
substantial mental impairments, and always accused of serious, terrible crimes.
The crimes of which they are accused bring out anger, hatred, and a quest for
vengeance on the part of most people, including judges, prosecutors, and, quite
often, even those appointed to represent the accused. All of this leads to, at
best, indifference and, more often, hostility toward the plight of those accused.
And many outside the criminal justice system are indifferent because they are
unaware of what passes for justice in the courts. There is a growing cynicism
about the importance of due process and the protections of the Bill of Rights.
Many of those who hold or aspire to public office find it impossible to resist
the temptation to resort to demagoguery to exploit these sentiments.
But this reality does not excuse the constitutional responsibility of the
judiciary and members of the legal profession to ensure that even the most
despised defendants still receive the highest quality legal representation in
proceedings that will determine whether they live or die. Justice William
Brennan, with his usual eloquence, once observed in another context,
It is tempting to pretend that [those] on death row share a fate in no
way connected to our own, that our treatment of them sounds no
echoes beyond the chambers in which they die. Such an illusion is
ultimately corrosive, for the reverberations of injustice are not so
easily confined .... [T]he way in which we choose those who will
die reveals the depth of moral commitment among the living.2"
Unfortunately, what has been revealed about the depth of moral
commitment among legislators, members of the bar, and the judiciary is very
discouraging. It is unlikely that the promise of Powell and Gideon will ever be
fulfilled for most of those accused of criminal violations. Legislatures are
unwilling to pay the price for adequate representation, most courts are
unwilling to order it, and most members of the bar are unwilling or unable to
take on the awesome responsibility of providing a vigorous defense without
adequate compensation.
The best hope for most of those facing the death penalty is that capable
lawyers will volunteer to take their cases and provide proper representation
regardless of whether they are paid adequately or at all. A member of the New
York Court of Appeals, citing the ethical obligation of lawyers to recognize
234. MeCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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deficiencies in the legal system and initiate corrective measures,235 has urged
lawyers to respond to the challenge of seeing that those who face the worst
penalty receive the best representation.
During the civil rights movement of the fifties and especially the
sixties, inspired attorneys, not all young neophytes, travelled often at
great personal expense and real risk, including their own deaths, to
make a difference. That spirit needs to be revived. Right now, it fuels
only a few who are to be commended for what they are trying to do,
but it has not motivated a sufficient number of people in our pro-
fession to do their needed parts, too. Until that conversion comes
about, Lady Justice may as well keep her eyes blindfolded so as not
to notice with shame the grotesque imbalance in the scales of justice
that hang from her fingertips, because of the growing numbers of
death penalty cases in this great country that are finally, really finally,
resolved under such disproportionate odds and resources.
Such spirit and commitment are desperately needed. When achieved, they
will undoubtedly make a difference for those persons represented. Indeed it is
hard to imagine how a member of the legal profession could make a greater
difference than by saving a client from execution. But the response of
individual lawyers will not be nearly enough to end the systemic problems
previously described and provide adequate representation to the thousands of
people facing the death penalty in this country.
Lawyers must not only respond, but in doing so they must litigate
aggressively the right to adequate compensation, to the funds necessary to
investigate, and for the experts needed to prepare and present a defense.
Lawyers must also bring systemic challenges to indigent defense systems.
Attorneys for the poor-whether in assigned counsel, contract, or public
defender systems-must refuse unreasonable caseloads and insist upon the
training and resources to do the job right. Where these problems make it
impossible for attorneys to discharge their constitutional and ethical
obligations, attorneys should frankly declare their inability to render effective
assistance.
And lawyers must continue to bear witness to the shameful injustices
which are all too routine in capital cases. The uninformed and the indifferent
must be educated and reminded of what is passing for justice in the courts.
The substandard quality of counsel for the poor and the lack of a structure and
funding for indigent defense must become part of the debate on crime. The
state and federal legislatures should not continue to enact capital crimes
235. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-25, 2-27, 2-29 (1980); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCi, Rule 6.1 (1983).
236. Joseph W. Bellacosa, Ethical Impulses from the Death Penalty: "Old Sparky's" Jolt to the Legal
Profession 29 (Dyson Distinguished Lecture, Oct. 26, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Pace
University School of Law).
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without considering the costs of adequate representation for the defendant and,
even if the costs are met, whether there is anyone to defend those accused.
Lawyers and law students need to be reminded that there continue to be people
with desperate, unmet needs for competent representation 2 7 They need to
be informed that the protections of the Bill of Rights are often denied those
most in need of them-poor, minority, and disadvantaged persons facing the
death penalty. The danger of silence is not only that lawyers will be unaware
of the need, but also that many in society will mistakenly assume that there is
a properly working adversary system in the criminal courts.
It is only by the witness of those who observe the injustices in capital
cases firsthand that others in society can be accurately informed. This
knowledge may prompt questions about the system and its limits such as:
whether the quest for vengeance receives too high a priority over the pursuit
of justice in the courts; whether criminal courts should be allowed to dispatch
people to their deaths without providing capable lawyers or even one penny for
the investigators and experts necessary to present evidence that is constitution-
ally indispensable to the punishment decision; whether indigent and often
mentally limited persons accused of crimes should continue to be denied the
protections of the Bill of Rights under the procedural default doctrines because
of the ineptness of lawyers they had no voice in choosing; whether the
assignment of lawyers to defend the poor should be made by judges who must
keep one eye on the next election and, with the other, often wink at the
Constitution; and whether courts should continue to demean the Sixth
Amendment by employing the Strickland v. Washington standard for "legally
effective counsel."
These questions must be raised vigorously until courts and leaders of the
bar realize that the judgments of the criminal courts cannot be seen as
legitimate and entitled to respect so long as such poor quality of representation
is tolerated. It is only by dealing squarely with these questions that there is
hope that the courts will face reality and deliver on the promise of Powell and
Gideon instead of indulging in wishful thinking and hollow pronouncements
about the right to counsel. One must hope that a frank discussion of the
deficiencies of the system will prompt courts to take their eyes off the
embarrassing target of mediocrity and take aim at a full measure of justice for
all citizens, especially those whose lives and freedom hang in the balance. One
must also hope that some prosecutors, who recognize a higher calling in seeing
that justice is done and making the adversary system work than in simply
getting convictions and death sentences against inept lawyers, will add their
voices regarding the need for adequate representation and limits on the power
237. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of Poor
Minority and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 Mo. L. REV. 849 (1992).
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of the courts. And finally, some law schools must respond and prepare students
better for defending criminal cases.
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently faced reality and created a
presumption of incompetence of counsel where provision of indigent defense
services are so lacking that defendants are not likely to be receiving effective
representation.23 8 Unless the state is able to rebut the presumption at a
pretrial hearing, a trial court is not to let the prosecution go forward until the
defendant is provided with reasonably effective counsel.239 This approach
responds much better to the reality of representation for indigents than
Strickland. Nevertheless, Justice Dennis pointed out that the court could have
done more:
This court should establish standards by setting limits on the number
of cases handled by indigent defense attorneys, by requiring a
minimum number of investigators to be assigned to each [public]
defender, and by requiring specified support resources for each at-
torney. If a defendant demonstrates further error due to funding and
resource deficiencies, the courts should be instructed to view the harm
as state-imposed error, which would require reversal of the conviction
unless the state demonstrates that the error was harmless.240
If systemic reforms are not attainable, other state courts could follow the
example of the Louisiana Supreme Court and prohibit the prosecution from
going forward in the absence of competent counsel. In addition, as long as trial
judges remain in the business of appointing defense counsel, conscientious
judges who are concerned about fairness can order the appointment of
experienced, competent lawyers, and just compensation at enhanced rates for
those lawyers. Trial judges could obtain the services of the best members of
the profession, those equal to the task of handling the highest stakes in our
legal system, but whose time generally is spent in more lucrative pursuits. The
appointment of the top litigators, managing partners, and bar leaders from
firms in Atlanta, Birmingham, Jackson, New Orleans, Philadelphia, Houston,
and Dallas to defend capital cases would undoubtedly change the quality of
indigent defense representation in those areas. It is remarkable that courts do
not call upon those lawyers to respond to the need.24 In addition to
introducing litigation skills to the cases, the involvement of such lawyers might
also result in some of them bringing their considerable power and influence to
238. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 791 (La. 1993).
239. Id. at 791-92.
240. Id. at 795 (Dennis, J., dissenting); see also Citron, supra note 169, at 501-04.
241. Judges in Knoxville, Tennessee, issued a decree mandating all of the licensed lawyers who reside
there to be ready to accept appointment of indigent defendants; even the Knoxville mayor, who had not
practiced law for years, was assigned a case. Klein, supra note 80, at 420, 427, 427 n.420. However, it
appears that no effort was made to see that those appointed had any litigation skills.
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bear upon the systemic problems, if for no other reason than to avoid future
appointments.
Such efforts, while urgently needed, will assure competent representation
to only a small percentage of those facing death and, at best, may prompt
reforms that will take years to accomplish. In the meantime, many will
continue to be sentenced to death at trials where they will receive only
perfunctory representation by lawyers who are not equal to the task of
defending a capital case and are denied the resources to do the job properly.
It is those poor people who will suffer the consequences of the failure of the
legislatures and the judiciary to discharge their constitutional responsibilities.
The death penalty will continue to be imposed and new capital statutes
enacted with the continuing promise that efforts will be made to improve the
quality of counsel in the future. But this is surely backwards. A very high
quality of counsel-instead of minimal representation-should not only be the
goal, but the reality before a jurisdiction is authorized to take life. Moreover,
the promise of adequate counsel is continually broken. It has been over sixty
years since the Supreme Court held in Powell v. Alabama that those accused
in Scottsboro and all poor people were entitled to a higher level of
representation in capital cases than merely being accompanied to their trials by
a member of the bar. Yet the representation in many trials today is no better
than that provided to the accused in Scottsboro in 1931. This longstanding
lack of commitment to counsel for the poor is one of the many reasons that the
effort to achieve fairness and consistency in the administration of the death
penalty is "doomed to failure."242
V. CONCLUSION
Courts have issued many pronouncements about the importance of the
guiding hand of counsel, but they have failed to acknowledge that most state
governments are unwilling to pay for an adequate defense for the poor person
242. Callins v. Collins, 62 U.S.L.W. 3546 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1994) (No. 93-7054) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Blackmun concluded that 20 years of "tinker[ing] with the
machinery of death" by the Supreme Court had failed to achieve "the constitutional goal of eliminating
arbitrariness and discrimination from the administration of death." He observed "a system that we know
must wrongly kill some defendants, a system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and reliable sentences
of death required by the Constitution." As we have seen, all too often the accused does not receive the
process that Justice Blackmun hoped would accompany a decision to impose death:
We hope, of course, that the defendant whose life is at risk will be represented by competent
counsel-someone who is inspired by the awareness that a less-than-vigorous defense truly
could have fatal consequences for the defendant. We hope that the attorney will investigate all
aspects of the case, follow all evidentiary and procedural rules, and appear before a judge who
is still committed to the protection of defendants' rights even now, as the prospect of
meaningful judicial oversight has diminished. In the same vein, we hope that the prosecution,
in urging the penalty of death, will have exercised its discretion wisely, free from bias,
prejudice, or political motive, and will be humbled, rather than emboldened, by the awesome
authority conferred by the State.
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accused of a crime. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not been vigilant in
enforcing the promise of Powell and Gideon. Its acceptance of the current
quality of representation in capital cases as inevitable or even acceptable
demeans the Sixth Amendment. It undermines the legitimacy of the criminal
courts and the respect due their judgments. No poor person accused of any
crime should receive the sort of representation that is found acceptable in the
criminal courts of this nation today, but it is particularly indefensible in cases
where life is at stake. Even one of the examples of deficient representation de-
scribed in this Essay is one more than should have occurred in a system of
true justice.
Providing the best quality representation to persons facing loss of life or
imprisonment should be the highest priority of legislatures, the judiciary, and
the bar. However, the reality is that it is not. So long as the substandard
representation that is seen today is tolerated in the criminal courts, at the very
least, this lack of commitment to equal justice should be acknowledged and the
power of courts should be limited. So long as juries and judges are deprived
of critical information and the Bill of Rights is ignored in the most emotionally
and politically charged cases due to deficient legal representation, the courts
should not be authorized to impose the extreme and irrevocable penalty of
death. Otherwise, the death penalty will continue to be imposed, not upon
those who commit the worst crimes, but upon those who have the misfortune
to be assigned the worst lawyers.
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